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Bian-Hu meet and Taiwan's future |
2005-07-13 09:24:24 |
Li Thian-hok
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ip: 220.X.X.X |
There has been much talk of a Bian-Hu meeting in recent months. During the journeys of Lien Chan and James Song to China in April and May, President Chen Shui-bian hinted that real political theater was yet to come. After delivering a speech at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington on July 6, DPP Chairman Su Tseng-chang urged that direct talks between presidents Chen Shui-bian and Hu Jintao be held in the US, even though the idea has been firmly rejected by Beijing. The former chairman of the American Institute in Taiwan, Richard Bush, has said recently that a "window of opportunity" for serious official cross-strait dialogue has opened which will last until the end of 2006, although settling Taiwan's future status is not possible near term.
Folly of a Bian-Hu Summit
While negotiations between the Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) and its Chinese counterpart ARATS on pragmatic technical issues such as repatriation of illegal immigrants and criminals, and controlling smuggling of weapons and drugs would be useful and may also serve to alleviate tension across the Taiwan Strait, a premature Bian-Hu meeting is not desirable for a number of reasons.
First, the China fever fanned by the Lien-Song team's pledge of allegiance to China and the attendant pro-unification propaganda of Taiwan's mainstream media is still raging strong, as witnessed by the recent aborted attempt by the Taiwan Solidarity Union to adopt a policy of greater contacts with China. When the DPP government talks wistfully about a Bien-Hu dialogue, the impression is inescapable that Taipei is begging for peace, that it may be ready to make another unilateral concession to the PRC on the vital issue of Taiwan's future status. This perception will not only undermine international support for Taiwan's continued de facto independence from China, it will also erode Taiwan's national will to defend its sovereignty and democracy.
Second, Taiwan's bargaining position is weak vis-a-vis China. Taiwan's military has been weakened by international isolation, steady cuts in defense expenditures over the last decade, and the DPP government's inability to implement the purchase of US arms due to obstruction by KMT/PFP legislators. Taiwan's citizens are not psychologically prepared to cope with Chinese military aggression. Politically, the gulf between the minority which favors unification and the majority which favors the status quo has never been wider. The DPP government appears incapable of learning from its errors. The policy of economic integration with China has increasingly marginalized the island's economy as an appendage of the Chinese economy. The policy of active opening has resulted in the influx of well over 300,000 PRC citizens in Taiwan, including intelligence agents and special forces operatives. Yet Premier Frank Hsieh and the Mainland Affairs Council are eager to promote more direct links and exchanges with China, with scant attention to the national security consequences of such policies. In diplomacy, the communications and mutual trust between Taipei and Washington need improvement. As Richard Bush has pointed out, Taiwan needs to do a great deal of hard work in national defense, domestic consensus, economic self-reliance and deft diplomacy before it is ready to negotiate with Beijing on the critical issue of Taiwan's future.
Third, while Beijing is very clear on its objective of absorbing Taiwan under the One China Two Systems formula or a variant thereof, the DPP government has yet to declare what it seeks for Taiwan's future except to say it does not rule out unification with China or Taiwan independence. Taipei's disadvantage in such negotiations is obvious in the absence of a solid national consensus and the resolve to defend the status quo.
Finally, no substantive result can be expected from a Bian-Hu meeting and any follow-up negotiations which would preserve the interests of Taiwan in keeping its de facto independence from China and its free way of life, because there is no workable compromise between independence and unification.
Compromise Proposals on Taiwan's Future
A close examination of two recent proposals in this regard may be instructive. One is a cross-strait stability agreement proposed by Kenneth Lieberthal, formerly Senior Director for Asia for the US National Security Council ("Preventing a War Over Taiwan," Foreign Affairs, March/April 2005). The other is a proposal for Taiwan to join a greater Chinese Union, made by Beijing-based Linda Jakobson, who is director of the China Program at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs ("A Greater Chinese Union," Washington Quarterly, Summer 2005).
Lieberthal is worried about the high risk of war in the Taiwan Strait over the next several years. He proposes a 20-to-30 year "agreed framework" between Beijing and Taipei, whereby the former agrees not to attack Taiwan and the latter agrees not to "cross the independence red line." The rationale is that after a generation, the changed situation may allow a peaceful resolution of Taiwan's future status. Because of America's interest in deterring a conflict, the US should strongly encourage each side to achieve the stability agreement. If either side does not agree, "it will pay a price in its bilateral relations with the United States."
There are several reasons why Lieberthal's proposal is good for China but bad for Taiwan and the US. The stability agreement will in essence ask the Taiwanese people to refrain from drafting a new constitution or change the country's name to Taiwan when in fact 80% of the public regards Taiwan as their country and only 14% regards Taiwan as part of China ("Contending Identities in Taiwan" by T. Y. Wang and I-Chou Liu, Asian Survey, July/August 2004). Deprived of the means to build a democratic state independent of Chinese control, morale in the military and civilian population will plunge and the majority people's sense of Taiwanese identity will erode, especially with Beijing's active united front intervention in Taiwan's partisan politics. Meanwhile the People's Liberation Army will continue to build up its capacity to overwhelm Taiwan by force, while both Taiwan and the US could become complacent and vulnerable to PLA attack.
Once the PLA calculates it can subdue Taiwan with a blitzkrieg before the US can even react, China will attack. China is known to violate agreements. China signed a 17-point agreement with Tibet in May 1951, promising political and cultural autonomy, religious freedom, and respect for the powers of the Dalai Lama. However, as China gained a stronger military foothold in Tibet, it began abrogating the terms of the Agreement. Following the 1959 March uprising, and the escape into exile of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan government was dissolved, and the Tibet Autonomous Region was formed in 1965, with the degree of autonomy to be determined by China.
If Taiwan were to accept Lieberthal's stability agreement, the island's fate will be sealed, and the US will be powerless to intervene.
In contrast to Leiberthal's interim agreement, Linda Jakobson offers a permanent solution to Taiwan's future status. Taiwan is to become part of a Chinese federacy, with its democracy safeguarded through international guarantees. Taiwan will be demilitarized but allowed to join UN suborganizations such as WHO, at least as an observer, under the designation of "Taiwan, Greater Chinese Union." In Jakobson's view, this is "the best that Taiwan can hope for, taking into account the reality of the island's geography."
There are also several problems with Jakobson's proposal. First of all, Beijing is not likely to accept the concept. China has been very effective in manipulating the divided national identity in Taiwan and weakening the authority of the elected DPP government by dealing only with the opposition parties. Chinese capital has reportedly penetrated Taiwan's already pro-China mass media. And if internal subversion does not force Taiwan to its knees, the PLA is ready to launch an invasion of Taiwan at short notice. So why should Beijing bother to give Taiwan a special status?
Taiwan's democracy is also a constant threat to the Chinese Communist Party's monolithic rule. The CCP will certainly want to destroy Taiwan's democratic system of government. There are no practical ways in which the US or Japan or the UN can guarantee Taiwan's democracy. The international community has done little even to improve the human rights of the Chinese people. It is of course possible for Beijing to accede to Taiwan's democracy as a temporary ruse, as part of an agreement to expedite Taiwan's complete capitulation. As in the case of Hong Kong, however, Beijing is bound to show its bad faith soon after settlement is made.
Conclusion
Both Lieberthal and Jakobson focus on the short-term need to defer military conflict in the Taiwan strait. Both fail to consider the long range impact Taiwan's future will have on regional security, the credibility of the US-Japan alliance, China's ambition to become the hegemon of Asia and beyond, and the security of the US homeland. Taiwan's future is closely tied to America's political, economic and security interests in Asia as well as the rest of the globe, because the way China tries to resolve its dispute with peaceful Taiwan will indicate whether or not China could evolve into a peaceful and civilized member of the global community.
For Taiwan, the urgent task is to build unity and the national will to defend its hard-won freedom. The past policy of unilateral incremental concessions to China in the hope that Taiwan's goodwill will be reciprocated is bankrupt. A-bian's popularity has fallen precipitously for a good reason ¡V the perception that he lacks the backbone to stand up for Taiwan's sovereignty and dignity. The DPP is in danger of losing its pro-independence core supporters. The KMT will have a solid chance to win the 2008 presidential election unless the DPP reverts back to its pro-Taiwan roots. A Bian-Hu meeting amidst the China fever could well sound the death knell of Taiwan's democracy. |
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