U. S. urged to change its Taiwan policy (II) 2005-07-25 12:09:28
Takayuki Munakata ip: 220.X.X.X

10. United Nations admits Taiwan's undetermined legal status

Beijing maintained that the U.N. acknowledged Taiwan as a part of the mainland as a result of the 1971 adoption of the Albanian resolution. But this was a sheer lie. In fact, the Albanian resolution carried connotations of the "undetermined legal status of Taiwan." The Chinese Communist government should know this well because Zhou Enlai, who had drafted the resolution, said as much to Kissinger.

What had pained Zhou in drafting the Albanian resolution was that he could not put in it the wording "expulsion of the Nationalist Republic from the U.N." If he had done so, it would have meant the removal of a member nation, which was unacceptable to the U.N. Zhou, therefore, exploited a thesis that Taiwan's legal status had yet to be determined. The San Francisco Treaty simply decided on Japan's abandonment of its dominion over Taiwan and made no reference whatsoever to whom the island should belong thereafter, thus leaving the legal status of the island undetermined. This is a consensus officially reached by the U.S., Britain and Japan. The legal status of Taiwan remained undetermined, meaning that the Nationalist Republic in Taiwan owned no territory recognized by international law. In other words, this republic was disqualified as a sovereign state in 1949 when it lost the mainland. This follows that the Nationalist Republic, clamoring in occupied Taiwan for a "recovery of the mainland," was not a state but a private group led by Chiang Kai-shek. It was in this context that Zhou put in his draft of the Albanian resolution the wording "expulsion of Chiang Kai-shek's delegation from the U.N." Communist China, however, had wanted most to keep such connotations of the Albanian resolution in the dark.

If the thesis about the "undetermined legal status of Taiwan" became the talk of the U.N., it would certainly raise problems as to the determination of the legal status of Taiwan and the representation of the Taiwanese people in the U.N.

The "Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples," adopted by the U.N. General Assembly Resolution 1514 in 1960, states: "All people have the right of self-determination, and by the exercise of this right, they have the freedom of determining their own political status and pursuing their economic, social and cultural development." This could mean that the people of Taiwan should be allowed to determine the political status, i.e., legal status, of their island, based on their right of self-determination.

The International Covenants on Human Rights, adopted by the U.N. General Assembly in 1966, borrowed in full for its Article 1 (The Right of Self-determination) the term "the right of self-determination" that is contained in Resolution 1514. The reason that the International Covenants on Human Rights set forth the right of self-determination in Article 1 was because it forms the very basis of all human rights. Those who have no freedom of determining their way of life and have their way of life determined by others are not free but slaves. Likewise, if any country has no freedom of determining on its own the way it should be and has its destiny determined by other countries, it is not a free independent country but a colonial dependency. What the Taiwanese seek is the freedom of determining the way their island should be, and it is Beijing that is out to colonize Taiwan by stripping the islanders of this freedom.

If the Taiwanese win international recognition of their right of self-determination, mainland China cannot annex the island forever. This was why Zhou Enlai, while drafting the "Albanian resolution" with the undetermined legal status of Taiwan in mind, was extremely afraid that other countries might realize that the resolution carried connotations of the thesis about the undetermined legal status of Taiwan. In 1971, Henry Kissinger visited Beijing twice and had talks with Zhou as often as 14 times. During their conversation, Zhou repeatedly demanded that the U.S. refrain from bringing the issue of the undetermined legal status of Taiwan before the U.N. "The Transcripts of the Secret Zhou Enlai- Kissinger Talks" (published in 2004 by the Iwanami Bunko, P. 159) carries part of their Oct. 21, 1971, conversation as follows:

Zhou: "It is impossible to contain any provision relating to the status of Taiwan in this resolution. If this is approved by the U.N., it means that Taiwan's status will remain undetermined."

Kissinger: "Even the Albanian resolution?"

Zhou: "I am afraid that it may involve such a risk. Of course, the countries backing the Albanian resolution, I guess, have not thought about it having such an aspect."

If a provision to the effect that "Taiwan is a part of the People's Republic of China" had been inserted into the Albanian resolution, the U.N. would have taken up the question of Taiwan's legal status. This would have possibly made the representatives of various countries to the U.N., who had been solely preoccupied with the matter of which side, Taipei or Beijing, should represent Taiwan, aware that they had forgotten about the rights of Taiwan and of its people. Viewed in the light of international law, it is obvious that Taiwan's legal status had yet to be determined, so not surprisingly, voices supporting the Taiwanese right of self-determination would grow louder. On top of that, a question would arise in the world body as to who should represent the Taiwanese people, though there was no problem about Beijing's entry into the U.N. as China's representative. Because the Chiang Kai-shek government ruled Taiwan and its people, there may have been some of the opinion that going the length of stripping Nationalist China of its seat as an ordinary U.N. member was tantamount to its expulsion from the world body. In that event, it would have become impossible to unseat Nationalist China from the U.N. This was what had worried Zhou Enlai.

When Zhou said, "If this is approved by the U.N., Taiwan's status will remain undetermined," he unmistakably referred to the Albanian resolution. To this, however, Kissinger asked the Chinese premier a stupid question: "Even the Albanian resolution?" Kissinger never made a single utterance about the people of Taiwan throughout the 14 or so conversations he had with Zhou. Perhaps, the people of Taiwan were the farthest thing from his mind. Despite being a veteran diplomat, Kissinger was not fully aware that drafting the Albanian resolution was an act of robbing the Taiwanese of their rights. Just as Zhou Enlai had told Kissinger, "The countries backing up the Albanian resolution, I guess, have not thought about it having such an aspect," the representatives to the U.N. from many member countries voted Taiwan out of the U.N.

11. Shanghai Communique no longer valid

Since the expulsion of the Nationalist Republic from the U.N., the U.N. has come to totally disregard Taiwan and its people. But the Taiwan question still remains unresolved, and the problem is becoming more and more serious with each passing year as it becomes a potential threat to world peace.

Losing the U.N. seat was a mortal blow to the Chiang Kai-shek government. Apparently losing interest in politics, President Chiang Kai-shek, who had remained in office until his demise, named his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, as head of the Executive Yuan (prime minister) in May 1972, empowering him to act in his place. Isolated from the international community, Taiwan found itself subject to fewer and fewer international pressures. Even in such circumstances, the Kuomintang government stubbornly stuck to the fallacy of being the legitimate government of China and did not allow Taiwan's people to voice objection. Hopes for the democratization of Taiwan receded as Kuomintang terrorism raged on.

In February 1972, U.S. President Nixon visited the People's Republic of China, and a Sino-American joint communique went public in Shanghai. This communique states: "The United States acknowledges that all Chinese living on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwanese question by the Chinese themselves." The first draft of the joint communique was prepared in the main by Kissinger on the basis of an agreement reached at his meetings with Zhou and without consulting the State Department. This draft carried the wording "all people on either side of the Taiwan Strait," but "all people" was rewritten as "all Chinese" at the strong request of the State Department, which had been shown the draft. Even in Taiwan, all Chinese citizens thought that Taiwan was a part of China, but many native Taiwanese did not think so. They simply could not express themselves for fear of Nationalist terrorism. Unable to distinguish between the Taiwanese and the Chinese, Kissinger himself had thought that Taiwan eventually would be incorporated into mainland China; hence, he must not have made much of the island. His surprise announcement of President Nixon's visit to Beijing at the crucial time just preceding the session of the U.N General Assembly threw the nations that were backing the U.S. over the issue of Chinese representation in the U.N., as well as the State Department, into dire confusion. This big diplomatic blunder led to the expulsion of the Nationalist Republic from the U.N. Had Washington had enough time back then to formulate adequate steps, there could have been many options to get Nationalist China to stay on in the U.N.

When I read the "The Transcripts of the Secret Zhou Enlai-Kissinger Talks," which went public in 2001, I had the impression that the talks had been conducted with Zhou having by far a greater advantage over Kissinger. For Washington, at that time, the conclusion of a peace treaty with Hanoi was imperative because it badly needed Chinese cooperation in withdrawing Americans from Vietnam. But Beijing was in the direst of straits in a confrontation with Moscow, resulting in its antagonizing the world's two superpowers-the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Still worse, in China back then, the whole nation was in utter disarray from the Mao-engineered Cultural Revolution. From this, Beijing was in much more need of American cooperation than Washington was of Chinese cooperation.

This awkward U.S. policy on China caused the Taiwanese to continue having a hard time of it, which in turn left the knotty Taiwan question a liability of the international community. But there still was a chance for the islanders. As a result of their democratization struggle, the Taiwanese won back freedom and became able to hold presidential and legislative elections on an equal footing with the exiles from the mainland.

The U.S. said not a single word about Taiwan's legal status in the Shanghai Communique. Washington simply acknowledged the fact that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan a part of China." It is in no way excusable nor is it absolutely realistic for the Chinese alone on either side of the Taiwan Strait to determine the future of Taiwan in disregard of the will of the islanders. Now that the situation has undergone dramatic changes, I think the Shanghai Communique has become a thing of the past, losing its validity long ago.

12. Establishment of U.S.-China diplomatic relations and the Taiwan Relations Act

In accordance with the Shanghai Communique, the U.S. and the People's Republic of China opened liaison offices in each other's country. President Nixon, who was elected for a second term, had planned to establish formal diplomatic relations with Beijing, but he quit in 1974 for his involvement in the Watergate scandal. Vice President Gerald R. Ford took over as president, but in the 1976 presidential election, he lost to his Democrat rival, Jimmy Carter; hence, the Republican government failed to fulfill its commitment to rapprochement with Beijing.

On Dec. 16, 1978, the U.S. and China released a joint communique, in which they announced they would establish diplomatic relations Jan. 1, 1979. The joint communique-again a product of clandestine talks between the two states-was made public in a surprise move, as was the Shanghai Communique. It was quoted as saying that the U.S. recognizes Beijing as China's sole legitimate government. Within this framework, the American people maintained with the Taiwanese people cultural, commercial and other non-intergovernmental relations. It is not specified by the communique whether "China" referred to therein should include Taiwan, but I think it would be appropriate to interpret Taiwan as not being included in "China," given the fact that Washington has not ever made public a change in its official view on the undetermined legal status of Taiwan.

In consequence of the U.S.-China rapprochement, the U.S. and the Nationalist Republic broke with each other, and the U.S.-China mutual defense pact became invalid at the end of 1979. The Carter administration said nothing about how the U.S. would involve itself in the subsequent national security of Taiwan. Chiang Kai-shek had died in 1975 and his son, Chiang Ching-kuo, assumed the presidency in his place. He censured Washington for unilaterally severing formal ties with Taipei, but he was not able to make clear how Taiwan should maintain national security after the U.S.-China treaty lost its validity.

What filled this gap was the Taiwan Relations Act, established by the U.S. Congress. Members of both houses, who were deeply concerned about Taiwan, drafted this law with the cooperation of pro-Taiwanese independence movement activists in the U.S. with whom they were on familiar terms. Approved by an overwhelming majority in both houses, the Taiwan Relations Act was signed and proclaimed by President Carter on April 10. Though enacted in a short time, this act, profoundly understanding and compassionate toward the difficult situation in which Taiwan and its people were placed, lays down American cooperation in Taiwan's democratization.

Following is the outline of the Taiwan Relations Act:

"To help maintain peace, security and stability in the Western Pacific; and to promote the foreign policy of the United States by authorizing the continuation of commercial, cultural and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan."

"It is the policy of the United States to declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern; to make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means; to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States; to provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan. The preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States."

The Taiwan Relations Act lays down its applicability to the islands of Taiwan and the Pescadores and other islands that belong to Taiwan and excludes its application to Quemoy and Matsu islands in Beijing's territorial waters. The Act also stipulates its application not only to Taiwan's ruling authorities that the U.S. had officially recognized until Jan. 1, 1979, as representing the Nationalist government but to the succeeding authorities as well. Reportedly, the Taiwan Relations Act will continue to apply when and if Taiwan has become its own governing entity after scrapping the Chinese constitution.

13. Kuomintang's dictatorship overturned despite repeated political persecutions

In the latter half of the 1970s, Taiwanese cries for freedom and democratization grew louder. Behind this were the growing morale of the islanders and a gradual erosion of the Kuomintang's sway.

To begin with, the Taiwanese acquired economic strength. Taiwan's high economic growth, which started in the 1960s, was shored up by a dramatic upsurge in exports by medium and small enterprises run by native Taiwanese. Most of the leading companies, run previously by the Japanese, were requisitioned by the Kuomintang and many of them were turned into public enterprises because the government-financed companies lacked strong international competitiveness, as usually is the case.

To market their products overseas, Taiwanese medium and small entrepreneurs hopped around the world, including to the U.S., which made it no longer possible for the ruling Kuomintang to stave off the inflow of information from outside the island. As the Taiwanese came to realize that they were being held in the grip of inhuman political terror, the ideology of the Taiwanese independence movement began spreading island-wide.

Around this time, Chinese generals, who had retreated to Taiwan along with the Chiang Kai-shek government, continued to maintain the Kuomintang army under their command, but islanders already formed a majority in the armed forces. This meant that there was the strong possibility that they would join hands with insurgents when and if Taiwanese people's pent-up frustrations touched off an uprising like the February 28 Incident. Because of this, even the dictator, Chiang Ching-kuo, had to be discrete; though, government terrorism went on.

Hard public feelings against the Kuomintang regime rose sharply as Nationalist China lost its diplomatic ties with most of the important nations in the world, including its closest ally, the U.S., after being driven out of the U.N. It was at this juncture that the Taiwan Relations Act, containing a section that makes clear that the preservation and enhancement of the human rights of all people on Taiwan are the objectives of the U.S., was enacted and greatly emboldened the islanders.

In August 1979, "Formosa Magazine," a monthly magazine, was launched for the dedicated purpose of forging ahead with the democratization movement on the island. It created an explosive sensation. Democratization movement activists, who rallied behind the new magazine, campaigned to muster like-minded people from across the island, which resulted in the rapid expansion of their organization. What any tyrannical regime fears most is the emergence of an uncontrollably powerful anti-government movement. On Dec. 10, International Human Rights Day, the Taiwan Publishing Company sponsored a human rights rally in Kaohsiung, which was attended by a huge crowd of 30,000 sympathizers. The Chiang government mobilized military police and security police to break up the massive gathering, after which it ordered 151 persons, including leading staff members of the publishing company, arrested. The government shut down the Formosa Publishing Company before it grew too powerful to control. In Taiwan, this event is called the Formosa Incident or the Kaohsiung Incident.

In broad daylight of Feb. 28, 1980, at the home of Lin Yi-hsiung, a defense attorney jailed in connection with this incident, his 60-year-old mother and 6-year-old twin daughters were stabbed to death while his 9-year-old eldest daughter was critically wounded. Everybody alleged that such a heinous crime was the work of Kuomintang agents, who had kept watch over the homes of leading figures imprisoned in connection with the said rally. The atrocities must have been deliberately engineered by the Kuomintang to remind Taiwanese citizens anew of the terror of the February 28 Incident of 1947 when the Nationalist Chinese massacred many islanders. The culprits in the family mass murder are yet to be identified.

On April 24, Rev. Dr. Kao Chun-ming, secretary general of the Council of Seniors of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan, and nine others associated with the church, were apprehended. In December 1971, immediately after the purge of Nationalist China from the U.N., the church had released what it called a "statement on national policy," demanding Taiwan's democratization and overall national assembly elections. This church statement called on people at home and abroad to recognize the Taiwanese people's right of self-determination, claiming, "The possession by every individual of the right to determine his/her own fate is ordained by God and confirmed by the U.N. Charter." The church had since continued appealing for Taiwan's democratization. Afraid of worldwide criticism, the Chiang government had in the past refrained from cracking down straight on Christian churches, but this time it went to the length of arresting leaders of the Council of Elders of the Presbyterian Church in Taiwan.

By resorting to a series of such repressive actions, the Nationalist government hopefully expected Taiwan's people to become as docile as they were after the February 28 Incident, but things did not turn the way it had expected. Many islanders consoled and encouraged the victims through this violent repression, and their families offered help.

Christian churches and politicians all over the world harshly criticized the Nationalist government for its series of political suppressions and demanded fair and open trials. Eight of the people arrested in connection with the Kaohsiung Incident and 10 nabbed in association with the church repression were put on military trial. In the past, there had been few or no cases in which military trials were held in public, but in the face of vehement international criticism, the Chiang government had to do so. Of the Kaohsiung Incident defendants, one was sentenced to imprisonment for an indefinite time, and seven others got prison terms ranging from 12 to 14 years. In the case of the church suppression, two defendants, including the pastor, Kao Chun-ming, were condemned to seven-year jail terms with hard labor, while four got prison terms of two to five years each. The remaining four were also found guilty but received a suspended sentence each. The defense attorneys for the defendants on military trial played a significant role in the subsequent democratization of Taiwan. Among them were two lawyers for the Kaohsiung Incident defendants, one the incumbent president, Chen Shui-bian, and the other, Vice President Annette Lu, who got a 12-year prison sentence.

Contrary to the Chiang government's calculations, Taiwan's democracy movement gained much momentum, with the series of political repressions as the prime mover. The result was the end of large-scale political repressions by the Kuomintang government; though, small-scale suppressions continued thereafter.

On July 2, 1981, Dr. Chen Wen-cheng, an assistant professor of statistics at Carnegie-Mellon University in the U.S., who had happened to be in Taiwan on leave, was taken to the Taiwan Garrison Command, the largest secret military agency on the island, and his mangled body was found dumped on the campus of National Taiwan University the following morning. It appears that mistaken for a pro-Taiwanese independence movement activist, he was tortured to death during interrogations by agents. Those responsible for his death still remain unidentified.

On Oct. 15, 1984, Liu Yi-liang, penname "Chiang Nan," 52, an American of Chinese lineage, was killed at his home in California. A journalist, he had just published "The Autobiography of Chiang Ching-kuo." As learned from an arrested accomplice, the murder was the doing of Chinese mobsters from Taiwan. Their boss had tape-recorded the order he had received from the director of the Intelligence Bureau of the Ministry of Defense, one of the Chiang government's secret service apparatuses, to kill Chiang and left the tape with his henchmen in the U.S. to look after for him. The gang boss apparently had done so for fear of being assassinated in Taiwan by Kuomintang agents. The outline of the heinous crime came to light as the police confiscated the tape, and the U.S. House of Representative passed a resolution demanding the delivery of the suspects involved in the case. The Chiang government did not comply, but it arrested the director of the Intelligence Bureau and the gang boss. According to a member of the gang, Chiang Hsiao-wu, son of President Chiang Ching-kuo, was infuriated on learning that Chiang Nan, in his "The Autobiography of Chiang Ching-kuo," criticized his father, and he told the director of the Intelligence Bureau to assassinate the author.

Events like political trials designed to obstruct the democratization movement were the order of the day in Taiwan, and such activities kept increasing in intensity on the island. In June 1986, incumbent President Chen Shui-bian, back then a Taipei municipal assemblyman, was imprisoned for eight months, along with the publisher and the editor-in-chief of a publishing company of which he had served as the president, on charge that an article carried in the political magazine published by the company constituted libel. They were put on non-military trial, so it took about 10 days before they had been imprisoned after receiving their sentences. In the intervening period, rallies were held daily, attended by several thousand people, in many parts of the island to encourage the three men. On the day they were jailed, the three, each wearing a sash across the chest with "honorable imprisonment" written on it, were seen off by the crowds of sympathizers, who accompanied them to the prison gate, shouting all the while, "Let's be jailed together!" At this time, political criminals were becoming heroes, and the masses were no longer afraid of political repression. Terrorism usually goes unchallenged because it holds the people in the grip of fear. But with the situation in Taiwan having come to such a pass, terrorism no longer worked as an effective instrument to silence the people, and preparations had been under way in secret to organize the Democratic Progressive Party.

What the Kuomintang feared more than anything else was the possible emergence of a political party that would challenge its one-party rule. Because martial law banned the formation of any new political party, it was held likely that organization of the Democratic Progressive Party would be suppressed. Therefore, pro-Taiwanese independence movement activists in the U.S. asked American politicians for help. On May 20, 1986, influential members of both the Senate and the House of Representatives formed a "Committee for Democracy on Taiwan" and released a statement: "Guarantee to the human rights and acceleration of democratization are the principal objectives of the U.S. policy on Taiwan. Hence, the Committee will call on the government authorities on the island to lift martial law and liberalize the formation of non-Kuomintang political parties."

On Sept. 28, 1986, 135 promoters gathered in Taipei and declared the birth of the Democratic Progressive Party. The minister of justice under the Chiang Ching-kuo government said that he would crack down on the formation of the new party as a breach of law, but the promoters included a long list of powerful independence movement activists all over the land. If the authorities had suppressed the inaugural meeting of the new party, it surely would have touched off an island-wide rebellion. On Oct. 7, Chiang Ching-kuo reluctantly gave way to the new Democratic Progressive Party by saying, "Any political party is bound to faithfully abide by the national constitution." In this way, the first democratic political party ever in Taiwan emerged at long last, putting an end to the Kuomintang's one-party rule by getting through a series of political suppressions.

14. Taiwan democratizes

In December 1986, the election of legislators (National Assembly members) was held. Of the quorum of 322, only 73 were elected. Considering that an overwhelming majority of lawmakers were perennial Kuomintang legislators, this election was nothing more than a make-believe show deliberately designed to appeal to the rest of the world that even in Taiwan parliamentary elections were held as a matter of established practice. However, among those elected were 12 members of the newborn Democratic Progressive Party, the fact of which marked a breakthrough in the democratization process of Taiwan. Now that the Democratic Progressive Party, formed in secret defiance of martial law, took seats in the parliament, the Kuomintang government had to abolish martial law.

On July 15, 1987, martial law, imposed over the past 38 years, was abolished. On January 13 of the following year, Chiang Ching-kuo, 77, died abruptly of illness and Vice President Lee Teng-hui, himself a native islander, was promoted to the presidency. The Kuomintang had picked him up as vice president-a dummy-from its policy of appeasing the Taiwanese. Chiang Ching-kuo reportedly had chosen Lee Teng-hui, an agro-economist and a competent business-like character, as vice president for not having, in his view, any political ambition.

The Kuomintang, the Nationalist army and the secretive military agency were the strong bedrock of the Chiang Ching-kuo government, but there was no longer a dictator like Chiang Kai-shek or Chiang Ching-kuo who had single-handedly held sway over all state affairs. Lee Teng-hui had no connections to any of the said three ruling apparatuses, and this made him a nominal top leader. The leading remnants of the National Chinese party thus held Taiwan in their grip while becoming engrossed in a power struggle among themselves, and they called President Lee a "robot president." Anyway, the people of Taiwan were happy to see their compatriot appointed the top leader on the island and backed President Lee with fervor.

With martial law removed and the dictators gone, the democratization movement in Taiwan spread fast among the masses. Among the movement leaders was Cheng Nan-jung, a character absolutely worthy of mention.

Cheng, publisher and concurrently editor-in-chief of "The Age of Freedom," a magazine, was the first Taiwanese ever to openly espouse the island's independence and carried in the December 1988 issue of his magazine a constitution for the Republic of Taiwan drafted by Dr. Hsu Shih-chieh while the latter was campaigning in Japan for the independence of Taiwan. Because the Penal Code stipulated that advocacy for Taiwan's independence was in itself an infringement on the law banning insurgency, Cheng was summoned to the High Public Prosecutor's Office in Taiwan. Cheng, insisting on freedom of speech, shut himself up in his editorial office and declared, "The Kuomintang cannot arrest me. It is my corpse only that they can catch." On April 7, 1989, Cheng, 41, committed self-immolation as police threw a cordon round his office. He laid down his life for freedom's sake, and as if inspired by God, his tragedy provided the impetus for rapid expansion of the democratization movement in Taiwan and led public opinion to increase in weight.

President Lee served out his predecessor's remaining term of office to May 1999. The Kuomintang was in confusion over who should be picked as the next president, but it chose Lee in the end, unable to ignore public opinion, overwhelmingly favoring him. Against the backdrop of across-the-board public support, Lee became the Taiwanese president both in name and in reality and came to play a central role in Taiwan's democratization process.

In May 1992, the penal code was revised so as to recognize the freedom of advocating the independence of Taiwan, and this prompted many of the Taiwanese independence movement leaders active abroad to return home to the island. Under pressure of the public opinion, perennial Chinese Nationalist parliamentarians lost their status, and in December, general elections for the National Assembly were held for the first time. With the birth of an authentic parliament elected by the people, Taiwan became a democracy in substance.

Consequently, the presidential term of office, which had been six years until then, was changed to four years, thus enabling the first direct election of the president by the people, and Lee Teng-hui won a landslide victory. In the 2000 presidential election, Chen Shui-bian was elected with 39 percent of the vote, with the Kuomintang divided after Lee's retirement.

15. Mao Zedong's nation-founding spirit and Taiwan

Mao Zedong, whose creed was "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun," often resorted to force in attaining his political purposes, even after he had founded the People's Republic of China by defeating the Nationalists in civil war. In October 1950, upon a request from Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union, Mao, with the fate of his country at stake, intervened in the Korean War and fought the Americans though the foundation of Communist China had not yet been solidified one year. At that time, Mao looked up to the Soviet Communist Party as a big brother of the Chinese Communist Party and boasted, "The Soviet Union and China are a monolith." Probably he had dreamed about making China strong enough to achieve hegemony in the world, together with the Soviet Union, by bolstering bilateral ties with participation in the Korean War as the catalyst.

In 1957, the Soviet Union succeeded for the first time in the world in testing an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) and launching a man-made satellite. Nikita Khrushchev, then secretary-general of the Soviet Communist Party, promised Mao to help China develop a nuclear bomb. Immediately after this, Mao demonstrated the posture of overwhelming the bloc of free nations, including the Soviets, during a speech he gave in Moscow, in which he referred to his rhetoric "The east wind prevails over west wind" and called American imperialism a paper tiger. Perhaps Khrushchev must have sensed a danger in Mao. At that time, the head of the Soviet Communist Party scrapped his commitment to Mao to assist in China's atomic bomb development. It was around this time that Mao decided that China should have nuclear weapons of its own no matter what the cost.

In 1958, Mao hammered out a "Great Leap Forward" policy for the purpose of enabling China to achieve spectacular economic strides entirely on its own. At this time, Mao clamored for the "liberation of Taiwan" and ordered the shelling of Quemoy and Matsu, islands off the Chinese coast, where Kuomintang troops were kept stationed. This was apparently intended to pull the people on the mainland together and to drive them to join in the "Great Leap Forward" movement. The Great Leap Forward policy, implemented in utter disregard of economic principles, was a catastrophic failure, but Mao had not given up the development of nuclear weapons.

Earlier, in 1954, Mao had ordered the bombardment of the Kuomintang-held islands of Quemoy with "Liberation of Taiwan" as the slogan. In May of that year, the French surrendered in Vietnam with their base at Dien Bien Phu taken by the North Vietnamese. This prompted the U.S. and Britain, as well as France, to prepare for the formation of a collective defense treaty organization to stem further expansion of communist influences in Southeast Asia. Mao had ordered Quemoy shelled in a move to prevent Taiwan from joining this projected collective security organization. Shocked by the bombardment, Thailand and the Philippines dissuaded Taiwan from taking part in the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO). This means Mao attained his political purpose using military threat. He also staged a border war with India in 1962 and with the Soviet Union in 1979, invariably with the intention of achieving his political end. After the demise of Mao, Deng Xiaoping sent a 200,000-strong Chinese army into Vietnam in 1979 on the pretext of "taking punitive action against the Vietnamese." It appears that Mao's nation-founding spirit justifying the use of force for the attainment of political purposes became a tradition of the People's Republic of China.

China has a historical tradition as being a powerful warring state, unifying itself and placing neighboring countries under its rule by use of force and holding sway over Southeast Asia. But any state of hegemony ever built in China by mainlanders had exhibited little interest in the seas except the Great Empire built by the Mongols, who had attempted twice to conquer Japan. Today, China cannot hope to achieve hegemony in East Asia unless it has naval supremacy. Fully aware of this, the Beijing leadership enacted in 1992 a territorial waters law, unilaterally defining as Chinese territory a large portion of the East China Sea and the South China Sea that is surrounded by the Philippines, Indonesia, Brunei, Malaysia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Taiwan and China.

If China annexed Taiwan, it would be able to practically dominate the East China Sea and the South China Sea and to make Southeast Asian countries around the South China Sea virtually its dependencies. In that event, China would find it impossible to sustain close relations with the Southeast Asian nations, as well as Japan. Still, the sea lane stretching as far as the Indian Ocean via the South China Sea along Taiwan's coast and the Malacca Strait literally constitutes Japan's lifeline. If Beijing rules Taiwan, it will mean that that China can get hold of Japan's lifeline.

Taiwan's population accounts for only 1/60 that of mainland China, but its gross domestic product (GDP) is more than a quarter of the mainland's, and Taiwan also has a fairly high level of technology. On the other hand, Japan has a population only 1/10 that of China, but its GDP is four times as large as China's, making it one of the world's leading nations in technological prowess and capital strength. Should China become strong enough to incorporate Taiwan and to make Japan its dependency, it could grow into a greater empire than the former Soviet Union, bringing about a dramatic change in the global balance of power. To Japan and Taiwan, nothing could be a greater tragedy than this. To the U.S. also, no worse nightmare could be conceivable than this because it would make a face-off with the Great Empire of China across the Pacific inevitable.

This is not a mere wild fancy. In the present-day world there supposedly exists no country that will invade China, a state overpopulated, poverty-stricken and poor in natural resources. Nevertheless, China is actually hell-bent on military buildup, obviously for political reasons. Internally, Beijing has been plagued by extremely frustrating problems. It advertises China's stunning economic growth. However, this growth is not the result of its own efforts but of absolute dependence on foreign capital and technology. Capital moves fast to sources of more profitable investment; hence, there is no guarantee whatsoever to China's future economic prosperity. Certainly, the Chinese economy has grown, but China's per-capita GDP is slightly more than US$1,000, and the gap between rich and poor is ever widening on the mainland, adding fuel to the frustrations of the destitute that form a great majority of the Chinese populace. For all this, instead of spending money for the relief of such underprivileged people, Beijing has given priority to reinforcing armaments. Presumably, Communist China is continuing its military buildup at the tremendous sacrifice of the masses, thinking that all knotty domestic issues can be resolved simultaneously when and if it occupies Taiwan.

Now the question: What conditions should Beijing meet in taking Taiwan?

China, for its part, absolutely must avert a military showdown with the U.S. Should war break out between the two powers, the Chinese may be able to inflict some measure of damage on the U.S., but it is obvious that China will obviously suffer devastating damage in a short space of time. Again, China should avoid protracted war with Taiwan. While war is on in the Taiwan Strait, foreign capital will not flow into China, and this will certainly put great restraints on China's external trade. Furthermore, there is the strong possibility that international economic sanctions will be imposed on China. This could lead to the swift collapse of the Chinese economy, which has attained impressive growth so far from heavy reliance on foreign capital and external trade, and also to the Chinese Communist Party's loss of governmental control.

Some Chinese military leaders have said that the U.S. would not be able to intervene in the Taiwan question if China came to possess guided nuclear missiles capable of attacking Los Angeles or San Francisco, but in our opinion, this is still arguable.

Such a Chinese strategy will not work if Washington makes clear its position that it will lose no time in resorting to all-out retaliation once the Chinese launch even a single missile at the U.S. To Beijing, in warding off U.S. military intervention, there would be no choice left but to keep American task forces from approaching the sea area around Taiwan. According to military affairs specialists, what the U.S. task forces dread most are missile-equipped enemy submarines. It is apparently for this reason that they are always operating by keeping themselves at a defensible distance from unidentified missile-armed submarines. In turn, it is perhaps with such an American strategy in mind that Chinese submarines recently have come to be sighted often in the Pacific.

If China deploys many missile-equipped submarines in the Pacific, it can hold U.S. task forces in check and threaten to attack New York and Washington, as well as Pacific coast cities. Not surprisingly, once such a precarious situation has arrived, China will threaten to attack Japan militarily, especially when the Japanese Self-defense Forces operate jointly with the Americans and let the Americans utilize their bases. Of course, there are strategies on the one hand and counter-strategies on the other. The Americans have military supremacy over the Chinese, so if Taiwan keeps fighting the Chinese forces, the U.S., we must think, will work out strategies to back up the Taiwanese.

Taiwan has 300,000-strong land, sea and air forces and is provided by the U.S. with weapons that meet defense requirements. Therefore, if the Taiwanese have the will to fight, they can defend themselves single-handedly for a considerable period of time. To conquer Taiwan by use of force, China has to land 100,000 troops on the island. China now cannot do so, nor will it be able to acquire any such military capability in the future. But if Beijing continues its military buildup at the present pace, China will become capable, in the foreseeable future, of encircling Taiwan with submarines and other warships and attacking the island from all directions with missiles and combined naval and air forces.

The Chinese Communists will not attack Taiwan right now, even if they have acquired such a degree of military prowess. Without question, China may be able to deal a heavy blow to the island militarily, but if Taiwan continues to resist, the U.S. will implement, in the intervening time, steps to help defend the island, and it is possible that the Chinese economy will first collapse, subject to international sanctions and the like. Beijing's purpose is to crush the islanders' sprit of resistance with military intimidation and make Taiwan cave in. This means forcing Taiwan to acknowledges that it is a part of China and accept the "one China, two systems" concept. If Taipei yields to such Chinese pressure, it will enable neither the U.S. nor the international community to involve itself in the Taiwan question. Letting Chinese troops be stationed on the island as in the case of Hong Kong amounts to the Chinese occupation of Taiwan. Beijing allows some measure of freedom to the former British crown colony in an attempt to have Taiwan accept the "one China, two systems" principle, but once China has occupied Taiwan, it will not have to be that considerate anymore.

16. America's founding principle diametrically oppose to Chinese creed of monolithic empire

It is the nation-building spirit that forms the backbone of American history. In the 17th century, thousands of Puritans, who had been suffering under religious persecution in Britain, fled to America across the Atlantic, resolved to build in a new world a state based on their faith. In 1776, 13 member states of the Continental Congress in America, which had been under British colonial rule, adopted the Declaration of Independence and entered into the Revolutionary War with Britain. In those days, Western Europe was in the age of Enlightenment, modeled on the thoughts of ancient Greece and Rome, and the thoughts that the founding fathers of America had in common were faith in Christianity, ancient Greek and Roman liberalism, and constitutionalism.

In World War I, the U.S. fought the German empire by siding with free nations-Britain and France. Similarly, in World War II, the U.S. fought Japan, Germany and Italy in support of free nations. During the Cold War, which ensued just after the end of World War II, the U.S. had a confrontation with the Communist-ruled Soviet Union, which eventually led the Soviet empire to collapse. It is said that the American mission is based on the nation-founding spirit to fight together with nations struggling to defend their freedoms and to help people fighting to win their freedom.

On Jan. 20, 1961, with the preliminary remark "We dare not forget today that we are the heirs of that first revolution," President John F. Kennedy, in his inaugural address, said, "Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty."

This inaugural speech by Kennedy and President George W. Bush's "speech on liberty and freedom" equally echo the nation-building spirit of the U.S. that stops at nothing in fighting for freedom. Defending freedom and helping people struggling in quest of freedom leads to the establishment of innate human rights and, at the same time, to the creation of world peace by universalizing freedoms. This represents the nation-building spirit of the U.S.

At the opposite end of this American nation-building spirit is Chinese ethnocentrism. This ideology dates to the days when Shi Huangdi, king of the state of Qin, unified the warring states on the mainland around 221 B.C. He institutionalized a central government with an absolute monarch above it. This is what the Chinese refer to as the "unification of the whole land." From then on, all the Chinese dynasties had sought to unify the whole mainland. Emperor Shi Huangdi was unique in that he not only integrated all of his domains but also brainwashed the intellectuals who belonged to the ruling classes. This absolute monarch, opposing Confucianism, ordered all the writings that might influence people against him, burned and also killed scholars who opposed him, by burying them alive. This was probably because he was afraid that granting the freedom of thought could lead to a clash of views among the ruling classes and eventually to a disintegration of his whole empire.

From the time of Emperor Shi Huangdi, unified states in China continued building the Great Wall of China around their domains in an attempt to defend the entire mainland from alien aggression. But non-Chinese neighbors incessantly invaded China, crossing the Great Wall. They also invariably sought to bring all of China under their control. They were able to conquer China by use of force, but their lack of knowledge forced them to borrow knowledge from the Chinese in unifying national thought. This led the Chinese to think that although conquered by force, they conversely conquered their rulers culturally. As a result, the nation's thinkers came to believe China was the world's superb culture. In this way, the principle of "unification of the whole land" whereby the absolute monarch dominated all people by ruling his territories and went so far as to unify the thoughts of the ruling classes became the nation-founding spirit for all states born on the Chinese mainland.

Russia's "Czarism" differs in this respect; though, it is akin to China's principle of national unification. The Czarists, born in 16th century Russia, had expanded their territory by use of force and controlled, at the same time, popular thought relentlessly. They never uttered a word against the will of the Czar but simply spoke his words repeatedly in public. However, some Russian aristocrats, who since their childhood had been educated in French and learned Western culture with the French language as a vehicle, were ashamed of their country's "cultural backwardness" despite the fact that Russia had become a mighty empire.

The Russian empire occupied Paris after winning the Napoleonic Wars, but Russian aristocrat officers, influenced by French liberalism, revolted against Czarism upon returning home. This revolt came to be known as the "Decembrist Uprising" and is why rumor had it that "Aristocrats first triggered the Russian Revolution." Eventually, it was the Communist Party that emerged victorious in the Russian Revolution. The Soviet empire built by the Soviet Communist Party was nothing more than a carbon copy of Czarism. The Soviet Union, which won victory in World War II, built a great empire, with East European nations in its iron grip, and became a superpower comparable with the U.S. In spite of this, Russian intellectuals were not able to rid themselves of their inferiority complex about "backward Russia." Therefore, President Mikhail Gorbachev forged ahead with democratization by "Perestroika." The result was the collapse of the Soviet empire and the eventual disintegration of the Soviet Union. The event reminded the Beijing leaders anew of the greatness of China's principle of "unification of the whole land" and drove home the rule never to relax thought control.


 
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