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Three Golden Rings for Taiwan |
2005-11-03 16:21:57 |
James E. Auer
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ip: 220.X.X.X |
The Author is the Director, Center for U.S.-Japan Studies and Cooperation, Vanderbilt Institute for Public Policy Studies (VIPPS), Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tennessee.
In March 1996 when Taiwan・s first democratic presidential election was held, Beijing tried to threaten the Taiwanese electorate by firing missiles into territorial waters near Keelung and Kaoshiung. Two US aircraft carriers were dispatched, the first to arrive of which, the USS INDEPENDENCE, arrived off Keelung from its home base in Yokosuka, Japan. On Friday, October 28th, the US and Japanese governments announced in Tokyo that the successor to the USS INDEPENDENCE, the USS KITTY HAWK will be replaced in 2008 with a nuclear powered aircraft carrier. The following day, in Washington, D.C. the U.S. Secretaries of State and Defense and the Japanese Ministers of Foreign Affairs and Defense announced new roles and missions for US and Japanese forces and a realignment of US bases in Japan. Both of these two announcements are very positive factors in support of Taiwan・s self-determination.
The threat of North Korea・s 200 plus intermediate range Nodong missiles directly threaten Japan the way Chinese missiles threaten Taiwan. China created North Korea・s nuclear weapons program and desires to force Taiwan from self-determination to repression similar to that exercised by Chiang Kai-shek. If China succeeds, not only will Taiwan lose the freedom it has enjoyed since the end of martial law and the advent of free national elections, but American and Japanese security in the Western Pacific will be compromised. China further desires to replace the U.S. as the chief source of influence in East Asia by driving a wedge between Japan and the U.S. and by convincing Taiwan, Southeast Asian countries and even Australia that they would be better to follow Beijing than Washington.
Despite its economic rise China cannot succeed unless Taiwan, Japan and the other Asian countries agree to live under Chinese hegemony. The October 29 Joint Statement reflects Washington・s determination to remain meaningfully engaged and Japan・s commitment to stand by its alliance partner of more than half a century. This is not only a step which benefits Taiwan, but it clearly benefits the U.S., Japan and other democracies in Asia. It will be criticized by the Chinese communist government as was the deployment of the two carriers in 1996, but I dare say it is even good for China whose government will respect the combined determination of Washington and Tokyo whose economies and militaries dwarf those of China and will do so for the foreseeable future.
The heart of the U.S.-Japan alliance is the U.S. Seventh Fleet which is often characterized as the ：spear； of the alliance while Japan・s Self-Defense Forces are the ：shield.； The tip of the spear is the aircraft carrier battle groups, of which the U.S. has 11, all of which will soon be nuclear powered and which can therefore travel faster, even in heavy seas, and can sustain themselves at sea without refueling for significant periods of time. Only one U.S. carrier has ever been based outside the U.S., in Yokosuka, where the USS MIDWAY was sent in 1973. Its arrival strengthened the credibility of the U.S. commitment to East Asian security immeasurably at a time when, as Beijing is saying now, Moscow was saying that it was the wave of the future in Pacific Asia.
On February 19, 2005, the same four Americans and Japanese who met in Washington October 29, met in Tokyo and promulgated ：Common Strategic Objectives,； one of which was maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. What this means is that, unless the Taiwanese people choose to become a province of China, the US and Japan will act to maintain Taiwan・s choice to determine their livelihood independently of Chinese coercion. The October 28 statement about the nuclear carrier and the October 29 Joint Statement means that Washington and Tokyo will have a far more efficient means of achieving those Common Strategic Objectives.
As reported in an interview by the Taipei Times published on October 31, retired Japanese admiral Sumihiko Kawamura, a former anti-submarine air force commander, stated that China・s submarines are mostly conventional and even its Kilo class nuclear submarines are easy to detect. He said that in conflict with the United States and Japan, China・s submarines were likely to last less than a week. Asked if he thought Taiwan needed to have new submarines as a top defense priority, Kawamura said P-3C anti-submarine aircraft and better command, communications, coordination, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (C4ISR) should take precedence. A few Taiwanese submarines which are unable to communicate with many U.S. and Japanese aircraft carriers, surface ships, anti-submarine aircraft and submarines might not survive a Chinese onslaught and the U.S. and Japan would be handicapped to come to the support of a Taiwanese Navy and Air Force with which it cannot communicate on a real (actual) time basis.
The February 19 statement of U.S.-Japan Common Strategic Objectives was an important signal to Taiwan and to China. The October 28 aircraft carrier decision and the October 29 statement of the U.S. and Japanese governments are evidence that by linking Taiwan to the U.S.-Japan alliance, today・s young Taiwanese and their children may continue to decide their own futures, a hard fought legacy achieved by their parents and grandparents after much suffering. Washington and Tokyo are acting in their own national interests, but their decisions of February 19 and of October 28 and 29 have presented Taiwan a golden opportunity for freedom in the 21st century. |
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