Why America Should Support Self-Determination for Taiwan

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Why America Should Support
Self-Determination for Taiwan
By Li Thian-hok

Speculations on a Fourth Sino-U.S. Communique

　　On April 30 a report from Beijing by the Agence France-Presse quoted U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright as saying the United States and the People𠏋 Republic of China (PRC) were working on a new communique on Taiwan, ahead of President Clinton's summit meeting with Jiang Zemin, his Chinese counterpart. " I don't want to predict what any final communique would look like on Taiwan," Albright told reporters at a press briefing. "Those are the kinds of issues we are working on currently," she added.

　　The May 1 issue of Japan's Sankei Shinbun (similar to the Wall Street Journal in the U.S.) headlined its report on the Albright press interview: "New Communique on Taiwan Hinted by Secretary of State." The report said the Chinese side demanded U.S. concessions on Taiwan and speculated that a new communique would have a substantial adverse impact on Taiwan's position.

　　Commentators in Taipei speculated that a Sino-U.S. joint communique or joint statement spelling out the new three no's was likely: i.e., the U.S. will not recognize Taiwan independence; the U.S. will not support Taiwan's entry into the United Nations; and the U.S. will not sell military weapons to Taiwan indefinitely.

　　The foundation of U.S. Taiwan policy is the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979. While the Taiwan Relations Act envisioned unofficial but friendly and close U.S. rela-tions with Taiwan, the three communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982 together have contributed to the increasing inter-national isolation of Taiwan. This is why there was grave concern and speculation in Taipei and Tokyo about a fourth communique.

Track 2 and the Nye Proposal

　　The significance of a new communique or joint statement on Taiwan was enhanced by a string of events which appeared to suggest a major shift in U.S. Taiwan policy.

　　In January, former Defense Secretary Perry led a delegation of former government offi-cials to visit Beijing and then Taipei. The delegation included former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Shalikashvili, former national security advisor Brent Scowcroft, former assistant defense secretaries Ashton Carton and Joseph Nye, Jr., and Richard Holbrooke who brokered the Bosnian deal. Although ostensibly unofficial, the delegation appeared to have official backing. Mr. Perry and his colleagues were given briefings at the Pentagon and other agencies before their departure for China and Taiwan. U.S. officials spoke openly of their hope that the delegation could achieve some success.

　　The so-called "track 2" channel of communication with China is designed to facilitate im-prove-ment of U.S.-China relations away from the stultifying ritual of Chinese statecraft, and away from the watchful eyes of the U.S. Congress. One chief aim of the unofficial delegation was to pro-mote a resumption of dialogue between China and Taiwan. There are a couple of problems with the track 2 concept, however. Congressional sources and some Pentagon officials said a potential problem was that some former officials might take advantage of the official imprimatur of "track 2" contacts to push their own business interests. Many of the former officials were not well informed on the current political situation in Taiwan or the history of PRC-Taiwan negotiations. Their ignorance caused dismay and consternation in Taipei.

　　In Taipei , Mr. Perry told senior opposition leaders, Taipei mayor Chen Shui-bian and chair-man of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) Hsu Hsing-liang, that the U.S. would not defend Taiwan if it declared formal independence. On March 5, former White House national security advisor Anthony Lake gave a speech in Taipei. Mr. Lake repeatedly stressed 𨯗merica will never sacrifice Taiwan," mindful of the Taiwanese people's adverse reaction to the Perry state-ment. But he opposed Taiwan independence implicitly by saying "Taiwan must not precipitate unnecessary conflict with China."

　　On March 8, Mr. Joseph Nye published his "A Taiwan Deal" article in The Washington Post causing a storm of protests in Taipei and in some quarters of Tokyo and Washington. The same article appeared on March 13 in The International Herald Tribune under a new heading: "Clear up the Dangerous Ambiguity About Taiwan." The Nye proposal contains three parts.

　　1.The U.S. would reiterate its "no use of force" policy. If Taiwan were to declare independence, the U.S. would not recognize or defend it. The U.S. would "work hard to discourage other countries from recognizing Taiwan independence."

　　2.Taipei would (a) forswear independence, (b) resume dialogue with the PRC, and (c) "stimulate greater flows of investment" to China.

　　3.Once Taiwan forswears independence, Beijing would not oppose the idea of more inter-national living space for Taiwan, such as participation in the Olympics. Beijing would offer Taiwan a 㺸ne country, three systems" approach to unification with the PRC.

A Collusion to Seal Taiwan's Fate?

　　Against this backdrop of track 2 activities and the Nye proposal, reports began appearing in the Japanese media that President Clinton had decided on a new policy towards Taiwan and that the Nye proposal actually represents the official U.S. position. An article in the April issue of Sen-taku (Choices) predicted that the Nye proposal would be implemented during President Clinton𠏋 June visit to China.

　　An article entitled "Can Taiwan's Freedom Be Preserved?" by Hisahiko Okazaki, former Japanese ambassador to Thailand and Saudi Arabia, appeared in Yomiuri Shinbun (the largest cir-culation daily in Japan) on June 1. This article carries weight partly due to the author's creden-tials and partly due to the message it carries. Mr. Okazaki comes from a family of distinguished diplo-mats. His father was Japan's ambassador to Moscow and to the Court of St. James. Mr. Oka-zaki is a noted geopolitical analyst and well-known commentator on foreign affairs, both in print and on television.

　　Mr. Okazaki postulates a collusion theory as follows. As part of its nationalistic ambi-tion to restore the realm of the Qing Empire, the greatest conquering dynasty in Chinese history with the exception of the Mongolian Empire, China plans to conquer Taiwan by intimidation if pos--sible, by force if necessary. However, China does not yet have the military capacity to invade Tai-wan. China needs peace right now to solve its urgent economic problems. What China fears most is that Taiwan may declare independence and force a conflict while the military balance does not favor China. Thus, under its policy of Lian Mei Zhi Tai (work with America to subdue Tai-wan), the PRC has asked, and the U.S. government has agreed, that the U.S. will pressure Taiwan not to take any steps towards independence until the PRC is powerful enough to compel Taiwan's capitulation.

　　Mr. Okazaki laments that America's role in such a collusion is unworthy of a great nation which was founded on the ideas of freedom and democracy. He observes that while the U.S. may ap-ply pressure on the current Kuomintang regime, it cannot impede the vic-tory of the DPP through a free and democratic election . More-over, "American intentions stem from checks and bal-ances among the president, the admini-stra-tion, the Congress, mass media and, above all, public opi-nion. Even commitments made by the president could be overruled by Congress." He warns that "to promise something which cannot be delivered may invite a crisis through misunderstanding."

　　During a June 30 roundtable discussion at Shanghai, President Clinton reiterated the three no's policy. He said: "...we don't support independence for Taiwan, or two Chinas, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement." To counter criticism from the U.S. Congress, media commentators and protests from Taipei, the Clinton administration insists that the three no's represent long-standing policy. In fact, the language was carefully worked out during Jiang Jeming's U.S. visit last fall in response to China's demand.

　　From Taiwan's perspective, even more damaging are Mr. Clinton's statements in Beijing on June 29. In a question and answer session at Beijing University, he said U.S. policy is not to obstruct, but rather to encourage, "beaceful reunification of China and Taiwan" through cross-strait dialogue. This is a radical departure from well-established U.S. policy that any disputes between Taiwan and China must be resolved peacefully. Peaceful settlement does not preclude self-determination by the Taiwanese people and it does not prejudge the future status of Taiwan. "Peaceful reunification," in contrast, indicates the Clinton administration would prefer that the Taiwanese people give up their freedom and place themselves at the mercy of the PRC's authoritarian rule, and do so peacefully with as little embarrassment to the U.S. as possible. Such an outcome, however, is virtually unattainable.

　　After struggling against 38 years of martial law under the Kuomintang government and at great sacrifice of tens of thousands of lives, Taiwan has finally developed into a vibrant democracy. The people of Taiwan enjoy civil liberties which are denied the citizens of the PRC. Per capita GNP in Taiwan is U.S. $13,000 per year or about 15 times that of the PRC. The Taiwanese are proud of their political and economic achievements and there is a growing resolve to defend Taiwan's hard-won freedom and de facto independence.

　　The Taiwanese people are overwhelmingly against unification with China for good reasons. Troops from China massacred 30,000 unarmed Taiwanese in March 1947. China's human rights record is not reassuring. During the Cultural Revolution, ten to twenty million Chinese per-ished. Today the People𠏋 Liberation Army is engaged in systematic harvesting and marketing of human organs extracted from executed prisoners. Several million prisoners are languishing in some 1,100 Laogai (forced labor) camps, including many political dissidents and religious believers.

Strategic Considerations

　　The Taiwan issue needs to be managed with prudence and forethought. If the PRC were to launch a preemptive military strike against Taiwan and Taiwan fell with U.S. acquiescence around the year 2007, what would be the strategic consequences for the United States and our Asian allies?

　　The PRC has passed a territorial waters law declaring most of the South China Sea to be Chinese territory. Once Taiwan falls into Chinese hands, the sea lanes on both sides of the island will be controlled by China. The lifelines of both Japan and Korea will be in jeopardy. The credi-bi-lity of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty may also be damaged beyond repair due to the following factors. First, a military conflict between Taiwan and China is likely to cause heavy casualties on both sides. Since the Chinese invasion of Tibet, China has caused the death of 1,200,000 Tibet-ans, or 25% of the population, through massacres and starvation. Suppose just 2.5% of the Tai-wanese people lose their lives during the conflict and the aftermath of liquidating 懀raitors," the number of Taiwanese deaths may well exceed 570,000. Taiwan is more visible than Tibet. The carnage will unfold before the horrified eyes of the world.

　　Second, for America to abandon democratic Taiwan to placate China's expansionist ambi-tion runs counter to the spirit and letter of the Taiwan Relations Act. It may be regarded by the Japan-ese as America's betrayal of the ideals of freedom and democracy. Finally, Japan could lose con-fi-dence in America's trustworthiness in general and in the credibility of the nuclear umbrella in par-ticular. Beijing would undoubtedly brandish the thermonuclear sword over the U.S. and Japan so it could have a clear field in attacking Taiwan. Japan's vulnerability would be driven home.

　　Japan will be faced with hard and unpala-ta-ble choices. The right-centrist proponents of nuclear armament may gain the upper hand and the Self-Defense Forces would go nuclear. There are no technological impediments to such a choice. Japan already possesses substantial amounts of weapons-grade plutonium and uranium. Japan's sophisticated space program can be readily converted to the development of ICBMs. Japan has the potential to become a formidable nuclear power in a short time. North and South Korea would likely decide to develop nuclear weapons as well. The repercussions from this nuclear proliferation will be dangerous instability of the Asia-Pacific region.

　　If the pacifist elements in Japan were to prevail, on the other hand, Japan would need to seek accommodation with China's growing nuclear arsenal. The vocal and influential Sino-cen-tric American strategists might not be overly concerned about the demise of the U.S.-Japan alli-ance. Japan could be reduced to the status of a docile protectorate of China. Under this sce-nario, China will be able to requisition Japan's considerable financial and techno-logical re-sources at will to build up its wealth and power. With the combined strength of China (includ-ing Hong Kong), Taiwan and Japan, it would not be unrealistic for China to aspire to become the world's greatest superpower in the next quarter century.

　　Under either scenario, America could well be forced to abandon its forward deployment strategy in Asia and withdraw to Guam and Hawaii. The national interests and security of the U.S. will be severely impaired.

How to Avert Military Conflict in the Taiwan Strait

　　China is rapidly modernizing its armed forces and developing military capabilities to harass and eventually invade Taiwan. In Taiwan, the DPP, the opposition party whose party charter in-cludes Taiwan independence, is gaining strength. It is likely the popular mayor of Taipei will win the presidential election in 2000 as the DPP candidate. Surveys show that an increasing proportion of Taiwan's twenty-two million population identify themselves as Taiwanese (as opposed to Chinese), and sentiment for Taiwan independence is growing.

　　There is an urgent need to reappraise U.S. policy towards Taiwan if the looming military conflict in the Taiwan Strait is to be prevented. It is critical that the U.S. stress to the PRC leader-ship the following ideas.

　　1.While the United States acknowledges the PRC's position that there is only one China and that Taiwan is part of China, the U.S. is not ready to recognize China's claim on Taiwan. The distinc--tion between acknowledgment and recognition has been woven into the fabric of the Tai-wan Relations Act and the three communiques. The United States needs to preserve this distinc-tion until the freely expressed wishes of the Taiwanese people are clearly made known.

　　The U.S. should not hesitate to point out to the PRC that in 1895 China ceded Taiwan (and the Pescadores) to Japan "in perpetuity" in the Treaty of Shimonoseki after China was defeated in the Sino-Japanese War. In 1945, Chiang Kai-shek's troops occupied Taiwan on behalf of the allied nations, much like General MacArthur's temporary occupation of Japan. In the 1952 San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, Japan gave up its sovereignty over Taiwan but the legal status of Taiwan was left open.

　　2.Any dispute between Taiwan and China must be settled through peaceful means. The Tai-wan Relations Act of 1979 states that the United States considers "any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means... is a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States."

　　While the threat of PRC military invasion is not imminent, military harassment or intimi-da-tion is feasible now. China's intention of taking Taiwan by force is increasingly evident. The United States needs to emphasize its policy of peaceful settlement to the PRC.

　　3.Under international law, the people of Taiwan have a right to determine their own future with-out outside military or political pressure. Neither the Taiwan Relations Act nor the three joint communiques take into account the democratization and Taiwanization which took place in Taiwan in the last ten years.

　　China has recently indicated its willingness to sign the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. This Covenant was adopted by the UN General Assembly on December 16, 1966. Paragraph 1, Article 1 of the Covenant states:

　　All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.

　　The PRC leaders need to start considering the wishes of the 22 million freedom-loving people of Taiwan. If the PRC persists in denying the Taiwanese people's right of self-determination, then its signing of the Covenant will be an empty gesture.

　　It would be wise to take additional steps to forestall military adventures by the PRC.

　　1.The U.S. needs to update its policy of weapons sales to Taiwan to enable Taiwan to cope with China's growing military power.

　　Section 3(a) of the Taiwan Relations Act states:
　　...the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a suffi-cient self-defense capability.

　　The military equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait is steadily shifting in the PRC's favor. China has acquired 50 SU-27 fighters and 4 Kilo-class attack submarines from Russia. China is deve-lop-ing high speed and accurate missiles which threaten Taiwan as well as U.S. forces deployed in the Far East. A lop-sided military balance will tempt the PRC to attack Taiwan.

　　The U.S. should consider selling Taiwan modern conventional submarines and new ad-vanced targeting and missile systems. The U.S. needs to expand and upgrade its military dialogue with Taiwan so that each side will become familiar with the other's military doctrine, operational methods and readiness. This is critical in the event of a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. Such an even-handed policy towards Taiwan itself may discourage any miscalculation and adventure on the PRC's part.

　　2.The resumption of negotiations between Taiwan and China is under way. Although public opinion in Taiwan will not allow any negotiation on the future status of Taiwan at present, there are many issues the two sides can talk about, such as legal safeguards for Taiwanese businesses operating in China, combating the smuggling of drugs and illegal firearms from China to Taiwan and the extradition of criminal elements. Dialogue will ease tension, allay mutual suspicion and minimize disputes.

　　3.To prevent any miscalculation by China, the U.S. needs to explain to the Chinese side how the U.S. government works. U.S. foreign policy is not the exclusive domain of the executive branch. Public opinion and the U.S. Congress also play an important role. In a poll conducted by Frederick Schneiders Research in May, 81% of American adults say they would be concerned if agreements reached at the Beijing summit jeopardized the security of Tai-wan. 71% support the position that the democratically elected government of Taiwan should be al-lowed to avoid union with China as long as it is governed by a communist regime. Allowing Tai-wan to join inter-nation-al bodies such as the United Nations gets the support of a very large majority -- 85%. Although ignored by President Clinton, the House of Representatives with a vote of 411-0 urged Bill Clinton to ask China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. On July 10, the Senate passed Resolution 107 with a vote of 92-0 to reaffirm U.S. commitments under the Taiwan Relations Act. On July 20, the House passed a similar concurrent Resolution 301 by 390 to 1.

　　The fact is, nobody can foretell how the U.S. will react if China should decide to attack Taiwan. Mr. Clinton's use of the phrase "peaceful reunification" was a Freudian slip of the tongue. Since it clearly contradicts the precise language of the Taiwan Relations Act, it cannot be a valid, new policy.

　　4.The PRC is engaged in an extensive military build-up, including MIRV'ed nuclear war-heads and anti-ship cruise missiles designed to threaten U.S. carriers. The U.S. must maintain and upgrade its military capabilities accordingly so its ability to guarantee peace and stability of East Asia remains credible. The U.S. should avoid any pronouncements or actions which cause China to doubt America's political will to honor its commitments. The U.S. cannot remain a great power once we start abandoning friends and allies under pressure.

　　5.It is not too soon for the U.S. to engage in dialogue with China regarding China's expand-ing nuclear arsenal and its effect on the Asian neighbors. In 1995, the U.S. adopted the forward deployment strategy in East Asia. The 100,000 U.S. troops are to help safeguard peace and stability of East Asia. China has historically regarded itself as the Middle Kingdom, or the civilized center of the earth, surrounded by barbarian tribes on all sides. After 150 years of humiliation by foreign powers, the Chinese have a deep sense of wounded national pride. There is a strong impulse to get back at the barbarians with a military show of force. It will take time, patience and firmness, but the United States must persuade the Chinese leaders and people that the way to redress historical grievances and for China to win the respect it covets is to adopt the universal values of human rights and democracy and to become a major stabilizing force in an increasingly globalized and volatile world.. China can once again be a great nation only then.

Conclusion

　　Communist ideology has lost all credibility in China. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) may well have lost its mandate of heaven due to the 1989 massacres at Tiananmen Square. The CCP relies more and more on strident nationalism to legitimize its authoritarian rule. The PRC's aggressive policy towards Taiwan is based partly on nationalism and partly on the weaken-ed civilian control of the Chinese military. A firm and consistent U.S. policy, ready to assert U.S. interest in the peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific region, will help the PRC's civilian leaders in adopting more moderate, peaceful policies.

　　The current policy of constructive engagement is dominated by corporate America's drive for access to the Chinese market. The risk is that such a policy tends to turn into a policy of ap-pease-ment, resulting in undesirable consequences. The recent nuclear tests by India and Pakistan are an example. The weakening of the U.S.-Japan alliance is another. The alienation of India is still another consequence. The U.S. needs to adopt a more realistic China policy which enhances our reputation for reliability and integrity among our democratic allies and which gives America's long range national security as much weight as short-term commercial profit.

　　A China which respects human rights is more likely to develop a rule of law, to honor international agreements and commercial contracts. President Clinton said China is morally right in pursuing democratization and a pluralistic society. If this judgment is correct and China does evolve into a democracy, then the possibility of conflict over Taiwan would disappear, since a democratic China by definition would undoubtedly respect the Taiwanese people's fundamental right of self-determination. The United States needs to insist on respect for human rights and the peaceful determination of Taiwan's future. This is the best way to win China's respect and to eventually bring China into the ranks of civilized nations, to the benefit of all.

August 19, 1998
Lansdale, Pennsylvania
c Jay Tsu-yi Loo