Nat Bellocchi

Remarks on "Taiwan National Security"
International Forum sponsored by
International Interchange Foundation
Taipei, Taiwan
November 7, 1998

   I have always been struck by the difference in priority given
to the Taiwan Relations Act by those who's responsibility is the
development of policy or the conduct of the relationships between
the U. S. the PRC, and Taiwan. If one says in a discussion, or
speech, or statement, that the basis of our policy toward Taiwan
is "the Three Communiques with the PRC and the Taiwan Relations
Act", the chances are good that that person's focus is the PRC.
If on the other hand, one says "the TRA and the Three Communi-
ques", the chances are better that that person works on Taiwan
affairs.
   It's a reflection of the differences that have always existed
since 1979 between the Administration and most China watchers in
the private sector, and the Congress and those whose sympathies
are with Taiwan.  It comes naturally, I suppose, and was
demonstrated so clearly by what transpired in fashioning the TRA.
   My fellow panelist Ambassador Feldman, has very ably described
how this came about, and the broad implications for America's
relationship with Taiwan. As Chairman of the American Institute
in Taiwan - authorized by the same TRA - from 1990 to 1995, I
have viewed that Act from the implementation side. It is from
that perspective that I would like to discuss our subject today.
   Some points that should be made is that in some places the
wording is ambiguous, probably deliberately to maximize flexibi-
lity. That has been bothersome on some occasions, but gratefully
convenient at other times. It nowhere uses the term "unofficial",
which has come to be the title of what we call the relationship.
And unavoidably, it was written in some places in a way that
reflected the situation in Taiwan at the time of the writing, and
which on occasion, complicates its use in arguing for changes
that reflect today's reality.
   Another characteristic, less obvious from reading it in the
present, final, form fashioned by Congress, is the short term
expectation that the Administration had at the time of its
writing, with regard to the need for the Act. The Congress
changed that in redrafting the bill, but the policy decisions
made then and by succeeding Administrations long after that,
reflect this short-term expectation. Many policy decisions were,
and in some cases still are, stop-gap measures that clearly
cannot be maintained over the long term.
   Given the change in the relationship made by the U.S., there
is no question it was profoundly strengthened by the passage of
the TRA into law, and in that sense, it has served its purpose
very well. Where I want to focus is on areas where problems have
arisen, so that we can then talk about either strengthening the
Act, or pursuing some other means of addressing the problems.
   With regard to the sections dealing with security, for
instance, the Administration within three years after the TRA was
passed, negotiated and signed a third Communique with the PRC
that contradicted the TRA. The Congress was concerned and called
hearings, but ultimately accepted the Administration's position
that since the PRC had clearly stated its intention to resolve
its issue with Taiwan peacefully, a gradual reduction in arms
sales to Taiwan was possible. Congress clearly didn't like it but
could retract the agreement. It did work to "lock in", through
public disclosure, the six assurances given Taiwan, and by
getting other public assurances from the Administration that the
provisions of the TRA would be observed.
   The struggle between the Executive and Legislative Branches
over the degree of authority each has over foreign policy has
existed since the constitution was written.  That document does
not address this point though the Executive Branch is generally
granted pre-eminence in this field, while Congress asserts its
authority mainly by its control of the purse. The TRA, in
establishing itself as the basis for a foreign relationship, was
an exception, and the third communique was seen as a challenge
to it by the Executive Branch.
   One result of this experience, therefore, was that the Congress
over several years made an effort to have the administration
publicly acknowledge that a law such as the TRA took precedence
over any communique. It never fully succeeded in getting this
acknowledgment in law, though Secretary of State Christopher more
recently did agree to send a letter to Senator Murkowski to that
effect.  Not entirely a satisfactory means of assuring future
executive agreements do not contradict domestic law.
   Another issue involving the TRA in which the Congress has not
gotten its way is in the procedure for the sale of arms to Taiwan.
After the original one-year moratorium on sales following the
enactment of the TRA, the Administration established a process
for considering and then either approving or rejecting specific
requests from Taiwan. Congress was notified only after the process
was complete and the commitment, or rejection, had been conveyed
to Taipei. Congress argued that they should be consulted before
the decision was made, but those members of Congress who pursued
this issue were unable to gain sufficient support in the whole
Congress to accept this view. As a result the precedent was set
and has been followed ever since.
   Another shortcoming in the system is that the Administration
has taken advantage of the requirement in the law that it should
notify the Congress if a threat to Taiwan's security exists.
Only then would the two branches of government consult on what
to do about it. The result is that the Administration has been
very reluctant to even use the word "threat" in describing the
situation at any time with regard to activities in the Taiwan
Strait.
   Two examples illustrate this potentially dangerous tendency.
Taiwan had for years been requesting the approval for purchase of
F-16s to replace the aging aircraft in the ROCAF inventory. For
more than ten years, successive Administrations had refused to
agree. Even when it became clear that the F-104's, for instance,
were dangerous to fly and spare parts were no longer available.
Reports to Congress by the Administration, even when challenged
by some concerned members, insisted that aircraft replacement
were not necessary, because, for one thing, the threat from the
PRC in air superiority did not exist.
   Another example was the dispatch of the carriers during the
missile crisis of 1996. We can recall that the PRC first fired
missiles at the time of the Legislative elections in late 1995.
The Administration complained publicly but did not consider the
PRC exercises that the missile firing were supposedly a part of,
as a threat.  Then in 1996, again there were exercises but the
missiles were now being aimed much closer.  The Administration
called them "irresponsible", but again, even at a formal
Congressional hearing called by the then even more concerned
Congress, the word "threat" was not used.  Later a second
carrier was dispatched, with repercussions in both Beijing and
Washington that are still being felt, but still without touching
the "threat" button that would call for initiating consultations
with the Congress under the TRA.  In both cases other factors
brought the actions that resulted.
   Two other important issues that received some attention in the
TRA used wording that was relevant at the time of the drafting of
the law, but now require an explicit interpretation to make them
applicable to today's Taiwan.  As a result they have been largely
ignored.
   Section 2 (C) reads: Nothing contained in this Act shall
contravene the interest of the United States in human rights,
especially with respect to the human rights of all the approxi-
mately eighteen million inhabitants of Taiwan. The preservation
and enhancement of the human rights of all the people on Taiwan
are hereby reaffirmed as objectives of the United States.
   Section 4 (d) Nothing in this Act may be construed as a basis
for supporting the exclusion or expulsion of Taiwan from continued
membership in any international financial institution or any other
international organization.
   The first is on human rights.  Clearly at the time of the
drafting of the Act, there was concern in the Congress that the
people of Taiwan might not be given the right to determine their
own future. There was at that time, as we can recall, a different
political system on Taiwan. The situation, of course, has changed.
The principle remains the same, but especially in the Administra-
tion, there now is a concern that the precipitate exercise of
this right might bring disaster not only on Taiwan, but for the
U.S. as well. Since the missile crisis, there are some both in
and out of the Administration, and some in Taiwan as well, who
would prefer to drop this principle when it becomes convenient
to do so by accepting that the wording of the Section in the TRA
makes it no longer applicable.
   The second issue is membership in international organizations.
Here again, the situation was different.  Some would interpret
the language as making it the reverse of what it is today.  The
actions of the ROC in the past permitted succeeding Administra-
tions to finesse the question of support, and therefore the
issue was never challenged.  Today, they say, the issue is not
staying in the international organizations, but getting in. The
wording in the Section, however, does include "exclusion" as well
as pulsion", and could be interpreted in a different way.  The
present Administration, in the Taiwan Policy Review of 1994,
actually took a step backward by formally stating it would not
support Taiwan's membership in international organizations that
require statehood, a distinction the TRA did not make.
   The TRA required the executive Branch to render an annual
report on the U.S. relationship with Taiwan, but for only the
first two years.  Thereafter, there had been hearings, on an
irregular basis, and usually with a specific issue within that
relationship in mind.  In any event, a report from the Executive
Branch, even one that included AIT, would inevitably present the
Administration's views.  Given the differences that have always
existed between the Executive and Congress on U.S. policy toward
Taiwan he reason behind the Congress asserting itself in drafting
and passing the TRA), Congress is unlikely to learn much about
the issues that most concerns it without considerable probing of
its own.  With the always busy Congressional calendar, this has
been a disincentive for more frequent hearings.
   The TRA left it up to the Secretary of State to "prescribe
rules as he may determine" to carry out the intent of the law.
Guidelines were developed by the Administration on how U.S.
Government personnel, AIT, and the Taiwan representative office
(then CCNAA) were to interact with each other to conduct this
"unofficial" relationship.
   The guidelines contain matters that include meetings, contacts,
travel, correspondence, and terminology, among others.  They
serve the purpose of keeping the relationship, in appearances at
least, as unofficial. It is a costly and inefficient system,
unilaterally developed on the U.S. side, and based primarily on
what the drafters thought the PRC would think about all these
various activities.  None are mentioned in the TRA, and on
occasion, some new guidelines must be developed to cover unanti-
cipated situations (such as transits through the U.S., or visits
by senior level officials of the ROC).  Once established, of
course, they set a precedence which whenever one is changed,
becomes an issue between the U.S. and the PRC. They also quickly
become a part of "policy".  Thus, in the Taiwan Policy Review,
almost all of the changes dealt not with substance, but with
matters that are included in the guidelines. In fairness,
Taiwan's own priorities often seem to be more on the guidelines
than on the substance of policy.
   Much of the TRA is taken up with many administrative matters
connected with the establishment of the American Institute in
Taiwan. While policy matters are determined by government and
implemented by AIT, administrative matters are often caught in
between the requirements of law regarding the private, non-profit
corporation character of AIT, and the government regulations that
deal with money and other administrative matters.  This is of
little interest to Taiwan but should, at some point in the future,
a means of changing or superseding some elements of the TRA be
found, administrative matters should be included as well.
   During the twenty years of TRA experience, there have been
countless times when amending the TRA was discussed. It rarely
went beyond a brief discussion, however, because it was always
almost instantly dismissed as a non-starter. It was, and remains,
conventional wisdom that trying to amend the TRA carries with it
too many risks, regardless of whether the objective was to
strengthen it, or undermine it.
   The normal practice for a member of Congress who wishes to
redress some problem that involves the TRA, or is connected with
the relationship in some way, is to introduce a non-binding
resolution. That conveys to the Executive Branch the sense of
Congress, but does not require the Administration to heed it. In
some cases an amendment is added to another unrelated bill that
would have the same effect, but would not be called an amendment
to the TRA. It is, in other words, difficult for Congress to
amend the TRA without opening it to efforts by the Executive
Branch to change it to their liking.  Likewise, it is not easy
for the Executive to neutralize the Act by amending it without
taking the same risk. The Taiwan Policy Review, an Administration
initiative, however, while it made several "policy" changes, were
in fact, with one exception, making changes in the non-substantive
guidelines not covered in the TRA.  The exception was the non-
support for Taiwan's membership in the international organiza-
tions, which arguably runs counter to the TRA Sec. 4.
   The most important policy established by the TRA was the
commitments on the security of Taiwan.  Though it is the law, the
wording is open to interpretation, so realistically it will
remain meaningful so as long as the Congress stands behind it.
As time diminishes the number of members of Congress who took
part in the passage of the TRA, the personal interest of members
of Congress, or when they are preoccupied on other matters, the
ambiguity of the language will offer opportunities for those who
mightt to weaken that commitment.  But it still remains the
pillar of our relationship with Taiwan.
   In terms of policy, the second most important element of the
TRA is the commitment to retain all the laws and regulations
necessary for continuing the commercial, consular and cultural
relations between the U.S. and Taiwan that existed before. That
has permitted the relationship to blossom both in mutually
beneficial commerce but in people to people relations that is
such an important part of that relationship.
   That the relationship grew so much during the first decade
of the TRA is a tribute to the efforts made by both sides on the
two important issues of arms sales and commercial/cultural
relations.  This emphasis continued in the second decade. But
Taiwan has changed, and other issues that result from Taiwan's
democratization need addressing.  The government and its
officials, which have normally been referred to as "authorities",
are now as legitimate as any found anywhere.  The society,
broadly speaking, is open as any found anywhere.  And the conduct
of its foreign affairs as subject to the will of the people as
found in any democracy.
   Given this transformation of Taiwan into an entirely different
kind of entity,  what are the challenges that now face the U.S. -
Taiwan relationship in the future, and has the TRA any role to
play in efforts to adapt other policies to the new realities?
My answer to the latter is yes, but not with the idea of changing
the TRA.  As we have seen, that carries with it many difficulties
and is therefore unlikely. By placing our focus on that possibi-
lity, we would be making the TRA a roadblock to change rather
than a basis for it.
   More likely is the use of the TRA, with its statements on
various policies toward Taiwan, as support for separate commit-
ments on specific issues.  For example, the TRA contains the two
paragraphs, referred to above, which are directly relevant to
the changes that have taken place on Taiwan, i.e. Section 2 on
human rights, and Section 4 on international organizations.
They were written at a time when Taiwan was different than it is
today.  So was the entire Act.  But on some issues, where there
was political will, the language was interpreted to accommodate
to the circumstances of the day.  For these two issues, however,
no change in the TRA would be necessary, but policies that better
accommodate to democratic Taiwan could be pursued with the support
of the Act as written.
   In human rights, for example, there was considerable disappoint-
ment in Taiwan when President Clinton made his statement on the
three no's in Shanghai.  In rationalizing the statement, the Admi-
nistration claims that it represents no change from the past. In
at least one sense, it does.  From 1979 to 1995 it was standard
policy by all who dealt with the PRC and Taiwan, that the U.S.
does not respond to questions of support or non-support of inde-
pendence. U.S. policy has remained that the two sides were to
ermine Taiwan's status, peacefully. 
   The rationale behind this approach is that while there was
always a concern that the U.S. could be dragged into a confronta-
tion with the PRC if this was mishandled, and therefore a good
reason to hope no unilateral change by either side would be tried,
the U.S. in this way would also avoid not supporting a fundamental
human right - the right of people to choose their own future.
   Now that there has been an explicit statement from the U.S. in
this matter, I believe there should also be an explicit statement
that any change in Taiwan's status should have the consent of the
people on Taiwan.  If one reads the hearings and the subsequent
comments by drafters of the Act, it shows that such a position
was clearly the intent of Sec. 2 (c).   Arguments that this
requirement is implicit in the U.S. position that there be a
peaceful resolution, does not sufficiently cover this commitment.
   Likewise with the issue of Taiwan's membership in international
organizations.  The U.S. has said, both in the Taiwan Policy
Review of 1994, and in the Shanghai statement made by President
Clinton, that it would not support Taiwan's membership in any
international organization that requires statehood. Since that
statement in both instances was not challenged directly by the
Congress, it is unlikely that the policy could now be turned
around.  More so as the Administration would claim rightly that
it would create a serious strain in the U.S. - PRC relationship.
   The TRA could still be used, however, as a basis for beginning
the process of seeking support for some kind of participation by
Taiwan in the international community.  There are alternatives
that could avoid contradicting the commitment made in the U.S.
statement on not supporting Taiwan's membership in international
organizations, by supporting not "membership" but some other form
of participation, for example.
   In the U.S., it is understood in government and among experts
that Taiwan is fully qualified, and even needed, to participate
in the international community. It is also clear, however, that
it is PRC objections that prevent this issue from being equitably
addressed. There may be other means of accomplishing the same
purpose.  Even more important is the need to encourage the U.S.
to adopt a different public stance toward this issue in its
relationship with the PRC.
   Instead of moving toward a more closer identity with the PRC
position on the Taiwan Strait issue, without changing U.S. policy,
it could alert the PRC that the U.S. believes Beijing's policy
toward Taiwan is dangerously outdated.  That the democratic
political system that now exists on the island is irreversible,
and that no viable resolution, whatever it might be, is realistic
without the consent of the people on Taiwan.  Justifying support
for some kind of participation by Taiwan in the international
community should be seen in this light, and would not contradict
the long-standing U.S. commitment that a resolution of the issue
must still be decided by both sides.
   This would require more political will in Washington than the
recent past has shown.  Beijing's strong opposition is no small
obstacle to overcome. Still a more realistic approach by the U.S.,
and hopefully by the international community, that recognizes the
changed circumstances democracy has brought to Taiwan, but which
does not seek to interfere in the ultimate resolution of the
differences on the two sides of the Strait, might gradually take
hold.
   The Taiwan Relations Act has demonstrated its worth in making
available the means for Taiwan to defend itself, which is its
most fundamental necessity.
   The U.S., under the TRA, also encouraged democracy, and helped
Taiwan in its efforts in developing the expansion of its economy
to international dimensions. But as experience has shown, the TRA
leaves great room for interpretation, and it depends greatly on
the attention, and the interest, of the Congress.  That will
continue to be the case. But will the TRA be equally effective in
helping  Taiwan cope with the changes that continue to take place?
   The economy of the PRC, even with the enormous problems that
make its growth so uncertain, has already grown to a point where
it has international, and especially regional, influence. The
globalization of economics, even with the problems that has
encountered in recent months, has put Taiwan at a disadvantage
in dealing with the increasingly important international
organizations.  And its democratization has forced domestic
political factors to be given a much higher priority in its
international relations.
   The TRA has not been useful in developing new American policies
that can recognize the legitimacy of the democracy that now
already exist on Taiwan, and the need to correct its exclusion
from the international community of which it is a part. These are
the most important commitments Taiwan needs from the international
community, including the U.S.
   In the meantime, Taiwan has its own very difficult challenges
to meet. None is more important than gaining a reasonable domestic
consensus on the relationship with the PRC. Too often, the
objective in seeking consensus is expected to be on a final
resolution of this issue (an expectation generated in no small
part by the PRC). But a consensus on an interim arrangement
leaving open the free choice of the people on Taiwan for the
future, might do much to garner international support for the two
issues, human rights and its place in international organizations,
mentioned in the TRA.