By Li Thian-hok
(Reprinted from FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
An American Quarterly review,
April 1958)
The present tacit moratorium on the Formosan problem does not
give hope that the question will simply resolve itself by the
passage of time; it does provide an opportunity to ponder a
solution of one of the major foreign policy dilemmas facing the
United States. Before pressure to admit Communist China to the
United Nations becomes irresistible, the United States should
relieve istself of the anomaly of supporting a government which
is held to be sovereign where it exerts no authority and which
lacks sovereignty where it does.
For it must be remembered that the United States holds the
legal status of Formosa to be in abeyance. It maintains that
neither the Cairo Declaration nor the Peace Treaty with Japan
has operated to make Formosa and the Pescadores formally part of
China. To endorse the Chinese claim of sovereignty over Formosa
was thought unwise, presumably because to do so whould automati-
cally link the question with that of representation of the two
rival Chinese regimes, and thereby give legitimate title to which-
ever regime was victorious in the civil strife.
Both Chinese Governments, of course, claim Formosa and the
Pescadores as Chinese soil on the basis of ancient historical
connection, the predominantly "Chinese" ethnic origin of the
population, and the Cairo Declaration, which stipulated that
"Formosa and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic
of China." As a result, the Nationalists are mistrustful of the
United States and the Communists are engraged. The United States
has also been placed on the defensive in the war of propaganda.
For if Formosa is Chinese territory, then disputes between the
People's Republic of China and Chiang Kai-shek groups in Taiwan
represent a civil war and any foreign attempt to obstruct the
liberation constitutes intervention in China's domestic affair.
But what if Formosa is not Chinese territory? It has wisely
been said that nationality is what a people think it is, and
formosans think of themselves as quite distinct from the Chinese.
Far from accepting the premise that Formosa belongs to China, a
majority of the 8,000,000 Formosans are anxious for independence
--a fact of which Americans seem hardly aware. And this is the
more strange because the principle offers the United States an
honorable way out of its present policy predicament. The parties
to the Japanese Peace Treaty, most of whom are members of the
United Nations, are free under the Charter (which would legally
prevail over the Cairo Declaration, according to Article 103) to
dispose of Formosa and the pescadores according to the principle
of self-determination rather than to restore them to China.1
Yet the United States so far has only said that Formosa's
status is undecided; it does not say that Formosa is not China's
territory. Hence, it cannot repudiate the Communist claim of the
right to "liberate Taiwan." Thus, by deliberately choosing the
policy of non-commitment and ambiquity the United States has
forced itself into an untenable position, and has supplied the
Communists with a great leverage in the propaganda war. For they
can readily persuade Asian neutrals that the United States is
occupying China's own territory.
American policy has also been greatly weakened by the fact
that the United States has retained de jure recognition of the
Nationalist Government on Formosa. The United States has repeat-
edly declared that it recongnizes the Nationalist regime as the
sole and legitimate government of China. Since it is a fact that
the Nationalists control only Formosa and the offshore islands
of Quemoy and Matsu, the de jure recognition of that regime is
easily construed as recognition of Formosa as Chines territory.
The American position is further worsened because of the Nationa-
list insistence that Formosa is a province of China. In order not
to demoralize the Nationalist Government, the United States has
been compelled to acquiesce in this interpretation, which has
been so skillfully exploited by Coommunist propaganda.
To summarize, the inflexible policy of supporting the bellig-
erent Nationalist Governement has placed the United States in
uncomfortable dilemmas. The United States does not want war, yet
it cannot make peace. It has been dangerously gagging itself,
while the Communists accuse it of interfering in the domestic
affairs of China, the "liberation of Taiwan." It has aroused the
displeasure of all parties concerned, the Nationalists, the
Communists and the Formosans. It has estranged the free Asian
countries and its own allies. It finds itself increasingly
isolated in the Formosa Strait.
II
As a way out of the Formosa impasse the so-called "Two Chinas"
doctrine has been informally suggested. The fact that this policy
has never been articulated by any responsible government spokes-
man makes it difficult to say exactly what it is. As far as one
can gather, the policy involves the recognition of two separate
independent nations: mainland China and Formosa China, each with
representation in the United Nations. In a press conference held
on January 20, 1955, President Eisenhower said that the Two
Chinas idea was one of the possibilities that was constantly
studied, but that both parties might be very reluctant to have
it seriously considered.
This was an understatement. Both Chinese Governments have
vehemently denounced the idea of Two China as un-Chinese. The
Communist leaders have staked their prestige to the very hilt by
repeated promises to "liberate Taiwan." They seem confident that
the Chinese on Formosa will not settle down permanently as exiles
but will eventually come to terms with the mainland Chinese as
repentant sinners. As for the Nationalist Government, to acqui-
esce in the Two Chinas concept means political suicide. It would
be a grave mistake to regard the "Restoration of Mainland" as a
mere slogan for stirring up the flagging morale of the National-
ist armed forces and for attracting the loyalty of the overseas
Chinese. A strong case can be made that conquest of the Chinese
mainland is indispensable to the survival of the Nationalist
Government. In order that the Nationalist regime may continue
its claim to be the sole, legitimate government of China, it must
keep insisting that conquest of the mainland is still possible
and in preparation.
The myth of the "Restoration" is important also in justifying
the dual structure of government by which the Chinese minority
manages to retain political control of Formosa. The Formosans
dominate all legislative bodies at the provincial level and
below, and while the provincial governments run the day-to-day
administration, they have no power to make any important policy
decisions. These are made by the Central Government, which is
built on the hypothesis that it still controls the whole of
China.
It is almost exclusively under the control of the mainland
Chinese. The extent of this domination is illustrated by the fact
that there are only 18 Formosans in the National Assembly of more
than 1,500 members, and the proportion is about the same in the
Legislative Yuan and the Control Yuan--the other important branches
of the Central Government filled by "popular election." This dis-
proportion in a country of 8,000,000 Formosans and approximately
1,500,000 mainland Chinese has of coures been justified on the
grounds that it is a transitional measure that will be adjusted
automatically when the "Restoration of the Mainland" is achieved.
Deprived of that possibility, the Central Government would have no
raison d'etre.
Yet the firm rejection of the Two Chinas idea by both Chinese
Governments has not put an end to speculation on this solution.
Especially in America, there are those who support the Two
Chinas concept with the claim that Formosa's independence has
been a fact for the past eight years and that the status quo is
likely to continue. They also argue that the Nationalist regime
on Formosa is based on "popular self-determination," and is hence
legally and morally defensible. But the situation inside Formosa
is not so stable and static as some of these have been led to
believe. There are many factors at work which threaten the
Nationalist regime; and the interplay of these factors may well,
within the foreseeable future, free American policy from the
dilemma of the Two Chinas.
III
It has been fervently asserted by many Chinese Nationalists
and their supporters in the United States that the Chiang Kai-shek
government on Formosa has now turned over a new leaf and that
earlier defects are rapidly being corrected. A survey of the
political and military aspects of Formosa today, however, does
not seem to warrant this optimism.
Chiang Kai-shek maintains government control through two
major instruments: the Nationalist Party and the secret police. 2
The Nationalist Party is financed, not by its own members, but
from the government treasury. The party can, and invariably does,
interfere directly with the official duties of party members in
legislative assemblies and administrative offices. Its aims and
methods are devoted to the perpetuation of its own power. The
party, in turn, is controlled by Chiang Kai-shek, who has always
made personal loyalty rather than ability or devotion to any
particular political program the first requirement for his
support of a subordinate. Individuals and groups with divergent
ideas about national policy naturally gravitate into rival
cliques. Instead of giving supreme leadership to any one of these
factions, Chiang has used them to check one another, thus
preserving his personal supremacy. The party, and consequently
the government, is Chiang's personal instrument and, despite much
talk of reform after the fall of China in 1949, the essential
character of the party has not changed. On the contrary, it tends
to be more authoritarian than ever.
The second and more powerful apparatus of control is the
elaborate secret police network under Chiang Cheng-kuo, the
Generalissimo's eldest son. Chiang Cheng-kuo is Russian-trained.
His experiences during his long years in the Soviet Union explain
why the method with which he now tackles the so-called
"Communists" is so carefully modeled upon the Communists' own
pattern. According to reputable American experts, the Nationalist
Government is employing 25,000 "political commissars" in the army
alone. These political officers are responsible only to the
Ministry of National Defense, to which they report directly. They
undermine authority and efficiency within the armed forces and
generate mutual suspicion and intrigue. To the Ministry of
National Defense come not only the reports of the political
officers but also information from the municipal police, the
military police and the Peace Preservation Corps, an organization
of picked members of the party. The secret police has its own
agents (answerable only to their chief) established in all of the
police forces, schools, and public and private business
organization. It has complete power to arrest, detain and
"interrogate" suspects.
The fearful feature of this situation is, of course, the lack
of legal protection for the ordinary citizen. He can be arrested
at night by a squad of secret police, tried by a military
court-martial and sentenced, with little opportunity for appeal.
Once taked into custody, the ordinary citizen is, in effect, at
the mercy of the garrison headquarters. A person may be arrested
because he actually is subversive; he can also be picked up
because someone who wants his job or property has denounced him
as a Communist. Reliance on terror has bred insecurity and
intense resentment, not only among the Formosans but among the
Chinese as well. Behind the mask of ritualized loyalty there lies
a seething undercurrent of pent-up frustrations and discontent.
Yet the relative inefficiency of Chiang's police controls,
combined with social and economic changes beyond the power of the
Chinese to control, make the Nationalists' positon increasingly
insecure. Of the island's 10,000,000 people, less than one-fifth
come from the mainland, and these are predominantly single males
and older couples. Given the high birth rate among the Formosans
and the Nationalist ban on migration from refugee centers in
Macao and Hong Kong, the Chinese face the future as a declining
proportion of the island's population. Formosans now comprise
more than 35 percent of the 600,000-man military force, and form
the core of combat effectives. They are gradually moving up into
higher echelons and, as the years go on, the armed forces will
eventually become predominantly Formosan.
The gradually improving power position of the Formosans also
owes much to the growing number of Americans scattered throughout
the political, economic and military sectors of the population.
The freedom of association granted to 8,000 or more Americans who
roam the island in Buicks or on bicycles inevitably opens the
door to uncontrolled communication between Formosans and
outsiders. "Today it is not unusual for groups of Formosan
students or professionals to visit American homes, speaking
freely about police controls, requesting intercession against
police oppression and criticizing Nationalist theory and
practice".3 More important, perhaps, the United States aid program
is undercutting the complete political and economic dominance of
the Chinese. Already highly literate, the Formosans are receiving
managerial training, denied them by the Japanese, which makes
them capable of taking over virtually all major operations. And
Formosan capital controls most of the local enterprises.
There are, however, impressive obstacles preventing the
Formosans from becoming politically articulate. There are no
independent Formosan newspapers, no recognized Formosan political
organization. Practically all active Formosans are forced to
enter the Nationalist Party. In external affairs the island's
representatives are exclusively Chinese. These checks have so far
prevented organized opposition from coming into the open. Yet
there are dynamic forces at work under the deceptively calm
surface of the political scene. So slow and subtle has this
process been, it easily escapes the notice of V.I.P.s who
regularly drop down on Pine Hill airport for a "fact-finding"
tour.
Another important factor, of course,is the morale of the
Nationalist armed forces, which is largely sustained by the
conviction that they are preparing for an imminent return to the
mainland and their homes and families. "Were they to be told that
their main function was to defend the island in which they live
as strangers, the effect on morale might be such as to make even
this relatively limited task impossible."4 The question may well
be asked how long the false hope can be kept alive before disas-
trous convulsions shake the regime.
While hope of recovery of the mainland appears to recede ever
farther into the future, Chiang Kai-shek maintains about 800
generals and admirals on full pay waiting for commands, a
skeleton officialdom for the provinces, and the Central
Government of China. Many of these leaders, and other Chinese,
are beginning to realize that Chiang's military and political
ambitions are untenable. Early in 1950 the morale of Chiang's
followers dropped almost to the vanishing point. General Wu
Shieh, deputy chief of staff, almost brought off a coup detat,
supported by a considerable number of professional army officers
and bureaucrats. The Nationalist Government initiated massive
executions to discourage further conspiracies. But the chief
reason why the Government did not collapse was the renewal of
hope, inspired by the outbreak of the Korean War, that the
Generalissimo and his supporters could go home with American
help. Now that the hope of reconquest of the mainland is again
diminishing, the possibility of defections cannot be lightly
dismissed. Only recently General Sun Li-jen, Chiang's former
chief of staff, was dismissed and put under house arrest when it
was disclosed that his aide and a large group of young army
officers were plotting a coup detat.
The Chinese Communist regime has adopted more subtle tactics
since the Bandung Conference and now calls for the "peaceful
liberation of Taiwan." While maintaining powerful bases and armies
across the Formosa Channel, it subordinates hostile military
gestured to undermining propaganda efforts. Relatives of
distinguished Nationalists, summoned to Radio Peking, invite the
emigres home. In a statement issued in June 1956, Premier Chou
En-lai offered to "negotiate with the Taiwan authorities on
specific steps and conditions for the peaceful libertaion of
Taiwan," promised amnesty for past offenses, rewards for "merito-
rious services," and even invited the Nationalists to return
to the mainland for short visits to their relatives and friends.
Such tactics are likely to prove far more effective than the
threat and bluster of an earlier period.
Under these circumstances, with Chinese morale declining and
Formosan hostility increasing, what does the future hold for this
island, sustained by the military and economic forces of the
United States? The aging Chiang holds together a precarious
regime, but how much longer can the status quo be maintained?
IV
Two distinct features run through the modern history of
Formosa.5 One is the continuous struggle for liberty against
unwanted intruders; the other is the long periods of separation
from China.
Throughout most of its history Formosa has been separated
from China politically, by virtue either of Dutch or Japanese
colonization, Chinese civil wars, independence, or lack of
concern on the part of China. During its nominal reign over
Formosa, the Manchu authority never succeeded in completely
pacifying the island; nor was there any indication that the
central government in Peking considered Formosa an integral part
of China. This is borne out by the hands-off attitude of the
Chinese Government in the face of a series of foreign expeditions
to Formosa in the last century. In June 1867, an American naval
expedition under the command of Captain Belknap made an
ineffectual attempt to take punitive measures against the
Formosan aborigines who had often inflicted outrageous acts on
the survivors of American and other foreign vessels wrecked off
the shored of Formosa. In 1871, a Ryukyu (Okinawa) vessel was
wrecked on the south coast of Formosa, and 54 members of its crew
were murdered by Botan tribesmen. The Japanese Government
presented an official protest to Peking and, unable to get
satisfaction there, dispatched the famed expedition under the
command of General Saigo in 1874. In both of these cases the
reply of the Chinese Government was that it could not assume
responsiblity, because the outrage had been committed outside its
jurisdiction.
From the beginning, Formosa was destined to become a spot for
racial contact and conflict. Tension developed between the Dutch
authorities and the Chinese settlers, and their descendants mixed
with other elements. Unlike the aborigines, the Chinese Formosans
wanted land ownership, which the Dutch refused. They wanted to
grow rice more than sugar cane, but the Dutch preferred sugar to
rice. In 1651, the Dutch began to collect a poll tax from every
Formosan of Chinese extraction above six years of age. Unable to
bear taxation and oppression, the Formosans in 1652 launched an
open rebellion. It was crushed immediately, and more than 4,000
men, women and children were massacred. Under the Manchus also
the Formosans were constantly turbulent. Partly because of the
inefficiency and corruption of the Chinese officials and partly
because of the frontier conditions, where no fixed pattern of
life had been set and where heterogeneous social, cultural and
racial groups had been brought together, the islanders continued
to defy the suzerainty of the Chinese by "launching one
disturbance every three years and one rebellion every five
years." In 1895, after China ceded the island to Japan, the
Formosans set up an independent republic and fought a desperate
war of independence against the superior Japanese army. Even
after organized resistance came to an end, the Formosans
continued their struggle for liberation by resorting to guerrilla
tactics and by launching 15 armed uprisings within half a
century.
In February 1947, reacting against what they considered
Chinese Nationalist maladministration and plunder, the Formosans
again rose. By March 6 most of the island was in the hands of
Formosan leaders headed by a Settlement Committee. The Committee
presented demands for political and economic reform, including
local autonomy and cessation of the "squeeze." The Chinese
Governor accepted the demands in principle and then secretly sent
for reinforcements from the mainland. The arrival of these
reinforcements on March 8 set off the "March massacres," in
which, according to first-hand reports of foreign observers, some
10,000 unarmed Formosans died. Some of the leaders who fled the
island and many others have been active in the Formosan
independence movement ever since.
This brief review will suffice to suggest that Formosa's past
struggles and manifest sense of identity give her the right to
claim nationality separate from that of China. Moreover, her
desire for independence is real and offers a way out of the China
impasse that is in the interests of the world community.
This has been recognized by several Asian countries and, in
April 1955, Sir John Kotelawala, then Ceylon's Prime Minister,
called for an Eight-Power Conference on Formosa, to include the
prime ministers of the Colombo Powers (Burma, Ceylon, India,
Indonesia and Pakistan), Carlos Romulo of the Philippines, Chou
En-lai, and Prince Wan Waithayakon of Thailand. It was reported
that Ceylon was planning to propose that Communist China renounce
all rights to Formosa and that in return Nationalist China's
sovereignty over the island would also end. According to The New
York Times: "The Ceylonese leader's plan calls for a five-year
trusteeship by either the United Nations or the Colombo Powers
over the island to replace its present administration. After
five years the Formosans would vote in a plebiscite to determine
their future form of government."6
The establishment of a free, independent state of Formosa as
a solution has many advantages and justificantions. The
strategic, political and psychological importance of Formosa is
such that the United States cannot lose the island to the
Communists without suffering a severe blow to its prestige and
presumably to its security. But if Formosa is to be kept in
friendly hands permanently, rather than until such time as it may
be abandoned with a modicum of grace, then a final settlement of
the island's legal status appears necessary. An independent
Formosa can rid the United States of the dilemmas arising out of
its support of Chiang Kai-shek. The United states need no longer
commit itself to the all-or-nothing proposition that Formosa must
either conquer China or perish. There will be no problem of
sustaining the morale of the people and the armed forces, since
the Formosans have a healthy distaste for any Chinese rule, and
will eagerly defend their native soil against aggression. By
relieving the Chinese Communists of a constant threat of
counterattack by the Nationalist regime, and at the same time
depriving them of a "legal" pretext for the so-called "liberation
of Taiwan," tension across the Formosa Strait may be materially
relaxed. Though in all likelihood Communist China will continue
to claim Formosa as Chinese territory, its case will be greatly
weakened, for it cannot oppose the principle of self-determina-
tion without considerable embarrassment.
By separating Formosa from the issues of Chinese
representation in the United Nations and recognition of the
Chinese Communist regime, the United States can recover freedom
of action. If Formosa were independent and an ally, the United
States would have every legal and moral justification for
defending the island, and allies of the United States, the
uncommitted nations of Asia and countries which recognize
Communist China would be able to support such efforts.
There is also a strong moral argument for a free and
independent Formosa. The Cairo Conference handed Formosa to China
without consulting the Formosan people, and thus was in violation
of the Atlantic Charter and the spirit of the United Nations
Charter. Like other peoples who have sought freedom, Formosans
look to the United States for defense of these principles. To the
Formosan people the United States is the symbol of democracy and
freedom, and the indispensable ally in their struggle for
independence. Rightly or wrongly, they believe that the United
States has a moral obligation to support their aspirations,
because it is the country which has largely given them such hopes
and ideals, but also because the United States was primarily
responsible for the Cairo decision, which denied the Formosan
people their basic human rights, brought them insecurity of life
and livelihood, and compelled them against their wishes to become
involved in a civil war in what to them is an alien country.
Support of Formosan independence would thus serve a broad moral
purpose as well as particular political and strategic purposes.
It would show that the United States is truly committed to
supportiing free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation
by armed minorities or outside pressure.
Some staunch supporter of the Nationalist regime have
maintained that the existence of "Free China" is essential to
keep alive aspirations for freedom among the Chinese on the
mainland, and to attract the loyalty of the 12,000,000 Chinese in
Southeast Asia. But "Free China" is not free and Chiang has very
little credit on the mainland or among overseas Chinese. And even
if the Communists were overthrown because they too had forfeited
the Mandate of Heaven, it is most unlikely that they would be
succeeded by Chiang Kai-shek or his successors. As for the
overseas Chinese, it is a hopelessly long-odds gamble to try to
build up Chiang Kai-shek as a symbol for their future. Their
latent threat to the stability of the region can best be
minimized by encouraging them to take part as normal citizens in
the communities where they reside.
The Chinese, both Nationalists and Communists, will object to
an independent Formosa on the ground that Formosa is a Chinese
territory and that the Formosans are "Chinese." But legally
Formosa is not Chinese. Historical evidence does not support the
theory that Formosa has always been an integral part of China. If
title can be claimed on the basis of past colonization, perhaps
the Dutch are more qualified to claim the island. Although the
Formosans are predominantly of Chinese extraction, this in itself
does not make them "Chinese." The fact is that they have come to
regard themselves as a distinct nationality group due to their
common historical experience, the modifying influence of
geographical environment, and from sharing a way of life, a set
of values and mores, and a common attachment to their native
land. The sense of nationality, as distinct from race, is not
biological but spiritual. As Renan has put it: "What constitutes
a nation is not speaking the same tongue or belonging to the
same ethnic groups, but having accomplished great things in
common in the past and the wish to accomplish them in the
future."
In population and industry Formosa is comparable to the major-
ity of the independent nations of the world; in cultural advance-
ment (90 percent literacy) and social organization (lawabiding
and public-spirited) the Formosans are highly qualified to manage
their own affairs. If the destiny of 8,000,000 Formosans is given
into their own hands, a dynamic and constructive society may
gradually emerge out of the present maze of confusion and bitter-
ness. Formosa could become another outpost of democracy in the
Far East.
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1. Quincy Wright, "The Chinese Recognition Problem," American
Journal of International Law, July 1955, p.333
2. Substantiation of the assertions made in this section may be
found in: Fred W. Riggs, "Formosa Under Chinese Nationalist
Rule," New York: Macmillan, 1952; H.M. Bate, "Report from
Formosa," New York: Dutton, 1952; "Sorrowful Advice," Time,
March 22, 1954, p.63
3. Allen S. Whiting, "Formosa's Future: Neither China?," Foreign
Policy Bulletin, September 15, 1956, p.7.
4. Riggs, op. cit., p.28
5. The island's history may be divided roughly into the following
periods: 1590, Western discovery by the Portuguese; 1624-1661,
Dutch colonial rule; 1662-1683, the Koxinga Kindom; 1684-1874,
a "protectorate" of the Manchu dynasty; 1875-1894, a province
of the Manchu dynasty; 1895, Formosa Democratic Republic;
1896-1945, Japanese colonial rule; 1945 to the present, Chinese
Nationalist rule.
6. The New York Times, April 22, 1955. Similar proposals have been
advanced by Clement Attlee, Adlai Stevenson, Chester Bowles,
Walter Lippmann, Eleanor Roosevelt, Professor Allen S. Whiting,
and others. The Formosan Democratic Independence Party also
advocates the trusteeship-plebiscite-independence formula.