Taiwan's history may be characterized as an incessant struggle for 
liberty against alien rulers.  On March 18, the Taiwanese have realized the 
dream of their forefathers with the election of Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's 
new president.  President Chen faces daunting challenges.  At home, he has a 
mandate to remove organized crime and tainted money interests from politics.  
Abroad he needs to keep peace with China and strengthen the support of the 
U.S., Japan and other nations, while preserving the de facto independence of 
Taiwan.
    None of the policy agenda is achievable without an adequate national 
defense, which in turn hinges largely on U.S. policy regarding Taiwan's 
security and its future.  In engaging the U.S. government, the Chen 
administration will be well advised to consider the following aspects of U.S. 
policy towards Taiwan.
1.  There is no consensus regarding Taiwan's ultimate status.
    Since the U.S. is a democracy there are discordant views on Taiwan's 
future among elements who can influence foreign policy.  Thus, while 
President Clinton leaned toward China's "One China" position in June 1998 by 
enunciating the three no's, the U.S. Congress repudiated his action by near 
unanimous majority right after Clinton's return.  The realist school of 
academics and former government officials tend to be sino-centric, stress 
trade with China to the exclusion of other considerations such as human 
rights, China's proliferation of nuclear technology, Taiwan's security and 
even America's security.  This group, supported by corporate America, will 
not object to Taiwan's absorption by China, even though they pay lip service 
to the principle of peaceful settlement and the desirability of democratizing 
China.  The neo-conservative school of scholars, former government officials 
and media commentators, on the other hand, are more concerned about America's 
national security and the potential threat from a rising, expansionist China. 
 They are also more committed to advancing democracy.  They are more prone to 
accept the Taiwanese's right to self-determination, provided the people of 
Taiwan can clearly demonstrate their will regarding Taiwan's future.  The 
media and the American public are generally sympathetic to the plight of the 
Taiwanese.  Whether Americans will be willing to shed blood in defense of 
Taiwan depends on the resolve of the Taiwanese to defend their freedom and 
the Taiwanese armed forces' performance in resisting Chinese aggression.

2.  Shifting policy stance
    U.S. policy towards Taiwan is based on the Taiwan Relations Act of 1979, 
the three joint communiques of 1972, 1979, and 1982, and President Reagan's 
six assurances in 1982.  Over the years, however, U.S. policy towards the 
ultimate status of Taiwan has gradually shifted from a neutral stance to one 
which leans towards the Chinese version of "One China."  This is due largely 
to the KMT government's national unification guidelines and its professed 
goal of eventual unification with China.  Even though the KMT government did 
stipulate three stringent preconditions (Taiwan must be treated as an equal, 
there must be economic parity, China must first democratize), the 
international community tended to just notice KMT's objection to Taiwan 
independence and to ignore the preconditions.  Thus it saw little need to 
recognize an interim regime.
    However, it should be noted that contrary to China's assertion, the U.S. 
has not formally recognized China's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan.  
America's "One China" policy differs from the Chinese version.  Any outcome 
of Taiwan-China negotiation is acceptable to the U.S. so long as it is 
peacefully arrived at.  The DPP government needs to stand firm on the 
non-negotiable principle of Taiwan's independent sovereignty so as to prevent 
a further weakening of U.S. neutrality.

3.  The three no's are an aberration
    The Clinton administration is peculiarly devoid of a world strategic 
vision.  It has concentrated on access to the China market and commercial 
profit and has at times been even oblivious of the basic requirements of U.S. 
national security.  It has often violated the letter and spirit of the Taiwan 
Relations Act, which promised the preservation and enhancement of the human 
rights of the people of Taiwan.  Clinton's acceptance of China's three no's 
formulation was an unwise departure from the carefully crafted, flexible U.S. 
policy towards Taiwan.  It is highly questionable whether the three no's can 
be deemed official U.S. policy.  It was never codified.  It was 
overwhelmingly rejected by Congress.  Also, nonsupport is not the same as 
objection.
    Clinton's term will end January 2001.  A new administration will take 
power next year.  It will most likely review and update U.S. policy towards 
Taiwan taking into account (1) Taiwan's democratization and Taiwanization, 
(2) China's military modernization and active preparation for war against 
Taiwan, and (3) China's White Paper ultimatum to attack Taiwan if Taiwan is 
slow in negotiating the terms of unification with China.  The DPP government 
should not be hasty in negotiating direct links with China or relaxation of 
restrictions on investing in China, pending the outcome of such U.S. policy 
review or clarification of the new administration's policy stance.

4.  Basic guidelines of U.S. policy
    U.S. policy towards Taiwan follows certain guidelines.
•   Any dispute between Taiwan and China must be settled peacefully.  This 
principle is designed to deter military conflict and hence U.S. involvement, 
to protect the people of Taiwan, and also to preserve U.S. role as the 
guarantor of peace and stability in East Asia.  If China were to "liberate" 
Taiwan with U.S. acquiescence, the credibility of the U.S.-Japan security 
alliance will be destroyed and the U.S. will have to withdraw from the first 
Pacific island chain, which runs from Japan, South Korea, Okinawa, Taiwan, 
the Philippines and Indonesia.  If China invades Taiwan, the U.S. will be 
compelled to act to protect its geopolitical and strategic interests.
•   Taiwan should not unilaterally declare formal independence.  Such an act 
would almost certainly precipitate a war in the Taiwan Strait.  While such 
conflict may be inevitable in the long run, the U.S. prefers the status quo.  
Some scholars believe it is better for the U.S. to fight a stronger China 
later rather than a weak China now, because China will have more at stake.
•   Democratization of China is desirable.  This is one of the reasons given 
for China's entry into the WTO and the granting of Permanent Normal Trade 
Relations to China. The preservation of Taiwan's democracy as a model for 
China is consistent with this policy goal.  The pro-China scholars argue 
spuriously that Taiwan's democracy can be preserved within the framework of 
one China, two systems.  However, China has consistently violated the basic 
human rights of its citizens and minorities.  China has already disregarded 
much of the agreement it has made with Great Britain in connection with the 
return of Hong Kong.  There is no reason to believe that China will honor any 
agreement it makes with Taiwan or that it will treat the Taiwanese any better 
than its own citizens.
    While it is important for the Chen administration to assure the U.S. it 
will not act rashly or do anything to provoke China, it is equally important 
to make Taiwan's position unequivocally clear that it will not under any 
circumstances give up its independent, de facto sovereignty.  The strength of 
U.S. support for Taiwan is ultimately dependent on the strength of the 
Taiwanese people's commitment to democracy and their resolve to maintain a 
separate political existence apart from China.

如有任何意見，請 email 到wufidata@wufi.org.tw，信件將登載於【大眾廣場】。
如內容適合刊登於《共和國》，我們也將在【言論廣場】轉載。
如果信件不願被轉載，請註明。感謝您的光臨與支持。