Taiwan is located in a strategically important position in Asia Pacific, a region of increasing military and commercial significance. Today, Taiwan is the fifth largest trading partner of the United States and its per capita income is over US$15,000. It is a democracy and one of the most reliable allies of the U. S. Therefore, the U.S. has a critical stake in Taiwan. Contradictions and inconsistencies have characterized U.S. policy toward East Asia in general and Taiwan in particular.

Before World War II

　　During his voyage to the Far East to clear the way for the expansion of American commerce, Commodore Matthew C. Perry viewed Taiwan as suitable for developing an American base of operations for the Asia-Pacific region. George H. Kerr, who had served as Director of Formosa Research for Naval Intelligence and Vice consul for U.S. Consulate in Taipei in the 1940's, writes:

　　In 1853-1854…Perry wanted the United States to annex Formosa, but knowing Washington would not approve, proposed instead that it should agree with Peking on a joint Sino-American economic development program. This, he believed, would guarantee peace and order and provide an American base countering rival British trading interest. In time (he wrote), a well-established American settlement would petition Washington for annexation as the Americans in Hawaii were then attempting to do.(Note 1)

　　During World War II, Japanese used Taiwan as the launching pad for MacArthur's defeat. Thereafter, Taiwan caught U.S. Army and Navy's attention as an important strategic point in Asia Pacific. The Navy steadfastly advocated Allied occupation of Taiwan after the end of the war, arguing that Taiwan's rich human and natural resources had a lot to bear in the postwar reconstruction of Asia.

　　However, throughout 1942 and 1943, the State Department stubbornly resisted discussing the disposition of Taiwan in isolation from the question of U.S.-China relations, arguing that China's population was far larger than that of Taiwan, and both were Chinese. Subsequent major U.S. policy decisions concerning Taiwan have followed the line of argument that regional situation and global objectives outweigh the rights of the people on Taiwan and U.S.-China relations outweigh U.S. interests in Taiwan.(Note 2)

After World War II 　　

　　As the war ended, the civil war between the Communists and the Nationalists went on, resulting in Communist victory on the mainland and the eventual retreat of the Nationalists to Taiwan. The U.S. reopened a consulate in Taipei. Despite the corruption of the KMT regime and the 228 Incident, in which tens of thousands of Taiwanese elitists were eliminated by the KMT regime,(Note 3) the United States continued to support the regime.

　　Only after August 1949, the Truman Administration ceased to provide the KMT with military aid. In January 1950, Truman declared, "the United States will not pursue a course that will lead to involvement in the civil conflict in China and will not provide military aid or advice to Chinese forces in Formosa. . ."(Note 4) Secretary Acheson placed Taiwan beyond U.S. Pacific "defensive perimeter."

　　If the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 changed the world, it certainly changed the fate of the KMT regime. Truman dispatched the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to block any PRC invasion effort. He declared, "the occupation of Formosa by Communist forces would be a direct threat to the security of the Pacific Area and to the United States forces performing their lawful and necessary functions in that area."(Note 5)

　　Thereafter for nearly two decades, U.S. government of both parties worked to make the Republic of China on Taiwan a bastion of the "free world." Between 1950 and 1965, the United States poured into Taiwan more than US$3 billion in military aid and over US$1.7 billion in economic aid. In 1954, the U.S. signed a mutual defense treaty with ROC. Moreover, the U.S. government staunchly upheld the KMT claims that it was China's legitimate government, blocking all efforts to seat the PRC in the United Nations.(Note 6)

The "Nixon Doctrine" 　　

　　In March 1969, the Soviet Union and the PRC broke into an open military conflict over a disputed border in the Far East. This underlined the reality of the Sino-Soviet split, which offered new possibilities for solving U.S. international security and economic problems. President Nixon began easing restrictions on U.S.-China trade. In the spring of 1971, the so-called "Ping-Pong diplomacy" led Nixon to send national security advisor, Henry Kissinger, to visit China secretly. The State Department dropped its opposition to seating the PRC in the United Nations. The U.S. and the PRC ceased to regard each other as enemies. Commensurately they studiously ignored the "Taiwan question."(Note 7)

　　In February 1972, Nixon visited the PRC and at the conclusion of his visit, the U.S. and the PRC governments issued a joint communique in Shanghai (thus known as "the Shanghai Communique," the first of the often cited "three communiques." Excerpts of the text are as follows:

　　The U.S. side declared: The United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China. The United States Government does not challenge that position. It reaffirms its interest in a peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves. With this prospect in mind, it affirms the ultimate objective of the withdrawal of all US forces and military installations from Taiwan. In the meantime, it will progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes.

　　The two sides reviewed the long-standing serious disputes between China and the United States. The Chinese side reaffirmed its position: The Taiwan question is the crucial question obstructing the normalization of relations between China and the United States; the government of the People's Republic of China is the sole legal government of China; Taiwan is a province of China…; the liberation of Taiwan is China's internal affair in which no other country has the right to interfere; and all US forces and military installations must be withdrawn from Taiwan. The Chinese Government firmly opposes any activities which aim at the creation of "one China, one Taiwan," "one China, two governments,' "two Chinas," and Independent Taiwan' or advocate that "the status of Taiwan remains to be determined."(Note 8)

　　The rhetoric of the Communique, however, did not turn out to be the real U.S. policy under the Nixon and later the Ford Administrations. The United States kept its embassy in Taipei and maintained its security relationship with ROC. U.S.-Taiwan economic relations continued to flourish.(Note 11) In the meantime, a new "China Lobby" was formed consisting of business executives, academic Sinologists, and unreconstructed American Maoists. The new group zealously promoted good U.S.-PRC relations at whatever cost to Taiwan.

Diplomatic Recognition Reversed 　　

　　The Carter Administration left policy toward East Asia to a group of academics and ex-foreign service officers, including Zbigniew Brzezinski, Michel Oksenberg, and Richard Holbrooke. This trio wanted to forge ahead with full normalization of relations with the PRC, creating a new level of strategic cooperation that would keep the Soviet Union in check internationally and opening up economic opportunities for American businesses. Based on this trio's ideas, President Carter announced on December 15, 1978 that U.S. would formally established diplomatic relations with the PRC on January 1, 1979. In the joint communique (known as the second of "the three communiques"), Carter reiterated that the Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China.

　　The Administration proceeded to close up the U.S. Embassy in Taipei, invoke the termination clause in the mutual security treaty, and withdraw remaining U.S. military personnel. On January 15, 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance indicated that even in the absence of diplomatic relations, the U.S. intended to take some concrete measures to assure a peaceful future for Taiwan: "[We] will continue [our] previous policy of selling carefully selected defensive weapons to Taiwan."(Note 12)

　　Carter faced considerable criticism over his measures for the new framework of relations with Taiwan. Congress was sympathetic with Taiwan and passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) with an overwhelming, bi-partisan support (the House vote was 345 to 55 and the Senate vote was 90 to 6), which Carter signed into law (known as U.S. Public Law 96-8) on April 10, 1979. This was the first time in U.S. history that Congress enacted legislation defining and setting U.S. policy toward a specific nation or political entity. The Act declared it the policy of the United States

　　To preserve and promote extensive, close, friendly commercial, cultural, and other relations between the people of the United States and the people on Taiwan, as well as the people on the China mainland and all other peoples of the Western Pacific area;

　　To declare that peace and stability in the area are in the political, security, and economic interests of the United States, and are matters of international concern;

　　To make clear that the United States decision to establish diplomatic relations with the People's Republic of China rests upon the expectation that the future of Taiwan will be determined by peaceful means;

　　To consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;

　　To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and

　　To maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.(Note 13)

　　In late 1979, President Carter was facing serious foreign policy crises around the globe: the seizure of American hostages in Iran, the assassination of President Park in South Korea; the Vietnamese invasion and famine in Kampuchea; the growth of militant Islamic fundamentalist movements in Saudi Arabia and Pakistan; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan; and the PRC's threat to improve relations with the USSR. With these new international situations as the backdrop, the Administration made some concessions, such as canceling an air travel agreement with Taiwan and granting the PRC Most Favored Nation trade status.

The Republican Administrations 　　

　　Ronald Reagan, a well-known political conservative and supporter of the KMT, made speeches about opening a separate embassy in Taipei during his 1980 campaign. But during his presidency he explicitly foreswore any U.S. involvement in settling the "Taiwan question." His Administration seemed to be very concerned with the delicate balance among security ties to Taiwan, the flourishing U.S.-Taiwan economic relationship, and the question of U.S.-PRC strategic cooperation. The Administration was torn in an ongoing struggle between geopoliticians, who wanted to continue Carter's 'China Card" policy, and the anti-Communist ideologues, who supported the KMT over Communist China. By the spring of 1982, the former group won out, and Taiwan policy became increasingly deferential toward the PRC.(Note 15) Reagan's policy was seriously incoherent and even contradictory.

　　On July 14, 1982, U.S. intermediaries in Taiwan gave the government there a list of six "assurances": (1) no date would be set for a termination of U.S. arms sales; (2) the terms of the TRA would not be changed; (3) the PRC would not be consulted in advance of U.S. arms sales decisions; (4) the U.S. would not mediate between Taiwan and Beijing; (5) the U.S. would not pressure Taiwan into negotiating with Beijing; and (6) the U.S. would not formally recognize Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan."(Note 16)

　　On August 17, 1982, the Reagan Administration signed a joint communique with the PRC in Shanghai (thus known as the "second Shanghai Communique" and the third of "the three communiques"), in which the Administration agreed that

　　The United States government…does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends to reduce gradually its sales of arms to Taiwan, leading over time to a final resolution.1(Note 17)7

　　This statement is clearly in contradiction with the TRA. The TRA unambiguously states that the U.S. will base its arms sales to Taiwan upon an objective assessment of Taiwan's defensive needs. The communique unambiguously states that the sales will gradually decline and eventually cease. The segregated, contradictory, short-term interests pursuing, and increasingly unsustainable policy of the Reagan Administration left Taiwan with a psychologically weakened security position and a growing potential confrontation between Taiwan and the PRC.

　　The Bush Administration largely continued with his predecessor's approach without taking the opportunity to foster a new, coherent, and consistent policy toward Taiwan. In the meantime, the PRC's military expansion became a serious concern to the U.S. American political leaders and especially Pentagon officials began to see the PRC's expanding military might as aimed at Taiwan and as threatening to upset the security balance in the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, President Bush announced the sale of 150 high-performance F-16 fighter planes to Taiwan. The sale was worth US$5.9 billion and represented an exception to the level of those supplied in recent years. It dealt a serious blow to the August 1982 Communique.(Note 18)

The Clinton Administration 　　

　　In his first term, President Clinton focused his work in domestic affairs and lacked a comprehensive foreign policy, especially a policy vis-a-vis the PRC and Taiwan. He ordered a review of U.S. policy toward Taiwan in 1994, which was completed in July and formally announced in September. Though the new policies had "tactical" significance, they represented little "strategic" change of policy.(Note 19) The Administration maintained a policy of "strategic ambiguity' in its relations with the PRC and Taiwan, that is, the "one China" position, which the three communiques stress, and insistence on a peaceful settlement between the PRC and Taiwan, which the TRA calls for.

　　Though neither the PRC nor Taiwan defied the ambiguous policy, both felt uneasy about it. Furthermore, the policy lacked support in the Congress, with the public and to some extent the media. In early1995, the PRC had become increasingly aggressive in other regions of Asia and its military power was growing exponentially. In June 1995, the visit of President Lee Teng-hui to the U.S. angered Beijing. Beijing reversed its rapprochement policy toward Taiwan and adopted a military stance thereby challenging the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity. In late1995, and again in early 1996 when Taiwan was holding first direct presidential election, the PRC conducted provocative missile tests near Taiwan's shores. In reacting to these instances, President Clinton dispatched an aircraft carrier to the region in 1995 and, in the 1996 instance, two aircraft battle groups constituting the largest military deployment in Asia since the Vietnam War. It sent a clear signal that the U.S. was prepared to use its military power to preserve peace and security in the Taiwan Strait. But at the same time, President Clinton began to give Beijing a series of unexposed guarantees that Beijing had constantly urged Washington to make public. (Note 20)

　　These events gave rise to calls from various quarters for the Clinton Administration to formulate a more luminous policy toward the PRC and Taiwan to replace the ambiguous one. The Administration's new policy toward the PRC was called "comprehensive engagement" proposing to form a "constructive strategic partnership" with the PRC. Its purpose was to engage the PRC in the international system so as to keep the PRC's behavior in check. At the same time, the U.S. made it clear to Taiwan that Taiwan as well had a responsibility to maintain peace in the Taiwan Strait by not provoking the PRC.

　　In June 1998 while visiting the PRC, President Clinton pronounced "three nos"-does not support "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan"; do not support Taiwan independence; and do not support Taiwan to join in international organizations as a sovereign state. In pronouncing these intentions, Clinton emphasized that the U.S. did not change its fundamental policy, namely, to maintain "one China" position, to call for the peaceful settlement over the "Taiwan question," and to urge Beijing and Taipei to engage in constructive dialogues.(Note 21) James Rubin, spokesman for the State Department, supplemented Clinton by saying that the "three nos" were announced on an insensitive and informal occasion in Shanghai and were not written into the communique.

　　Whatever the Administration's explanations were, the "three nos" were against the public opinion. (Note 22) They also alarmed Congress. On the eve of President Clinton's trip to China, the House, by a vote of 411 to 0, urged Clinton to ask China to renounce the use of force against Taiwan. Soon after the pronouncement, on July 10, the Senate passed Resolution 107, by a vote of 92 to 0, to reaffirm U.S. commitments under the TRA. On July 20, the House passed a similar concurrent Resolution 301 by a vote of 390 to 1. On Octover 9, the House passed Resolution 334, by a vote of 418 to 0, to support Taiwan's entry into the World Health Organization.(Note 23)

　　Like the August 1982 Shanghai Communique, the "three nos" had gone beyond the policy statements that the U.S. officials had ever made.. Never before had the U.S. indicated that the U.S. would not support Taiwan to enter international organizations as a sovereign state. This announcement and the proposal of an "interim agreement" (Note 24) between China and Taiwan had been taken by Taiwan as a shift of balance toward China and thus began to weaken Taiwan's trust and faith in the U.S. psychologically, if not substantially. In any event, they made Taiwan wonder if the U.S. had changed or was changing its policy toward Taiwan

　　With the "three nos" in its hand, the PRC made every effort to get Taiwan into political dialogues under the "one China" framework. The PRC, however, steadfastly stuck to its insistence of using military force to resolve the "Taiwan question" if necessary, and continued to build up its military power and step up its military activities across the Strait. These events have made Taiwan rather uneasy. (Note 25)

　　In June 1999, Richard Bush, Chairman and Managing Director of the American Institute in Taiwan, reiterated five principles of the approach of the U.S. government toward the disagreement across the Taiwan Strait relations:

1. 　　The United States has insisted and will insist that the Taiwan Strait issue be resolved peacefully.

2. 　　Constructive and meaningful dialogue between Taipei and Beijing is the best way to resolve differences that exist between them.

3. 　　The issues that divide Beijing and Taipei "substantive and otherwise" should be resolved by the two sides themselves.

4. 　　The United States will remain even-handed in its approach to cross-Strait dialogue. And

5. 　　Any arrangements concluded between Beijing and Taipei should be on mutually acceptable basis…any results of cross-Strait dialogue will have to have broad public support. (Note 26)

The Fallacy of the U.S. Policy 　　

　　As stated above, U.S. policy toward Taiwan has had a tendency to emphasize on short-term interests. Every administration since Nixon has done an about face on Taiwan without offering the people of Taiwan a guarantee that the U.S. would support self-determination. The Clinton Administration has been unable to discern what American interests are in the post-Soviet relationship with China. China remains a Leninist dictatorship and it intends to whittle away U.S. leadership in Asia with dictatorial arrogance. However, a course of escalating tension and conflict with the U.S. is not an option for a Chinese regime that wishes to continue to grow its economy and to win the trust of the Southeast Asian countries. On the other hand, Taiwan has been one of the most trusted democratic allies of the U.S. The coming of economic success and vibrant democracy to Taiwan has a great significance for the U.S. and for international relations. For the U.S. to abandon democratic Taiwan to placate China's expansionist ambition runs counter to the ideals upon which the U.S. has been built. It may be regarded by the allies of the U.S., such as Japan, South Korea, and others, as America's betrayal of the ideals of freedom, self-determination, and democracy.

　　The Clinton Administration has apparently been unable to discern the difference between "acknowledging" China's position in 1972 and embracing a one China policy. It also failed to distinguish between avoiding support for recognizing Taiwan as a nation and standing in the way of such recognition. President Clinton himself failed to distinguish between leaving Taiwan's relationship with the PRC up to two sides and declaring reunification to be the America's agenda, as he did in his remarks in Beijing in June 1999. All these may be taken by Beijing to assume that it is entitled to increase its pressure on Taiwan and believe they now have an amber light to use tactics of military intimidation. That may be a miscalculation, but it is precisely through such miscalculation that wars start.

　　The military equilibrium in the Taiwan Strait has been steadily shifting in China's favor. A lopsided military balance will tempt China to attack Taiwan. However, the U.S. government at times showed reluctance to sell defensive arms to Taiwan as the TRA mandates, and even threatened to withhold a planned arms sale as a reaction to President Lee "state to state" theory. A more even-handed military policy toward Taiwan may discourage any miscalculation and adventure on China's part.

　　The PRC has effectively isolated Taiwan's international relations and the U.S. has been a part to the isolation. Taiwan has made positive contributions to Global society and remained a model global citizen and abides by the rules of treaties to which it is brusquely denied membership. In return, the Clinton Administration pronounced an unprecedented "do not support Taiwan to join in international organizations as a sovereign state" in Beijing. In the debate on a proposal to place Taiwan's admission to the United Nations on the agenda this year (1999), for the first time, the U.S. spoke against it. The U.S. has replaced its ambiguous with a luminous policy in favor of China and at the expense of Taiwan.

The Shock of the "State to State Theory" 　　

　　On July 9,1999, when he was interviewed by the Voice of Germany, President Lee Teng-hui spoke of the reality of "one nation, two states" (in Taiwan it is commonly dubbed the "two states theory"兩國論) and defined the relations between the PRC and Taiwan as "special state to state" relations. President Lee and other officials have repeatedly expounded on various occasions that the new definition merely states the realities on the relations between the PRC and Taiwan and is not a departure from Taiwan's long-held position. (Note 27) However, the theory created a lot of shock in Washington and Beijing though it contained nothing substantially different from President Lee's previous statements. (Note 28)

　　Beijing reacted with its usual hysterical bellicosity. It regarded the theory as separatist, a step closer to an outright declaration of Taiwan independence. It sent barrels of harsh criticism against President Lee personally by calling him names. It even made threat of taking military actions against Taiwan.(Note 29) It postponed indefinitely a long-planned visit by Wang Dao-Han, Chairman of the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, to Taiwan in October 1999. It pressurized Washington to press Taiwan to retreat from the statements. Perhaps mostly outrageously, it warned U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to "be very careful not to say anything to fan the flames" of independence. (Note 30)

　　The Clinton Administration was in fundamental agreement with Beijing's position that Lee's statements were unacceptable and provocative. It repeatedly reassured Beijing that the U.S. is entirely with it in this matter. To show it to Beijing, the Administration cancelled a long-planned visit of an American team to Taiwan to discuss security matters and intimidated that planned U.S. arms sales to Taiwan would be postponed. It dispatched officials to Beijing to "apologize," to "express our regret", and to "offer compensation." At the same time, it dispatched an official to Taipei to demand a clarification on President Lee's statements. (Note 31)

　　U.S.Congress reacted favorably to Taiwan as Beijing became more threatening and intimidating. Some members of both house of Congress have stepped up an ongoing effort to pass a proposed "Taiwan Security Enhancement Act." Public opinion in general was more favorable to Taiwan. (Note 32)

Conclusion 　　

　　The so-called "three pillars" of the Clinton Administration's policy-"One China," "dialogues between Beijing and Taipei," and "peaceful settlement" - may be instrumental in enabling the U.S. to stay away from the dispute between the two sides and thereby allowing the U.S. to pursue its military and commercial interests. However, the U.S. has never indicated how the tension between China and Taiwan must and should be settled. The proposed "interim agreement" is more specific as to maintaining peace in the Taiwan Strait, but it did not touch on the future status of Taiwan and how the dialogues are to be conducted.

　　 If dialogues are not conducted on equal status and in equal terms, it will be difficult, if not impossible, for the dialogues to take place. If they are forced upon, its outcome will not be well accepted and long lasting. The PRC has repeatedly denied Taiwan's equal status. The theory of "one nation, two states" is nothing but an indication of Taiwan's frustration and earnest desire, and it must be taken by the U.S. seriously. Therefore, in urging both sides to engage in dialogues, the U.S. must insist on this point.

　　It is true that the PRC is a super power that the U.S. must reckon with and deal with carefully. Yet, if the PRC is allowed to bully Taiwan and browbeat the U.S. into accepting its terms, it is what it will do. If the PRC is allowed to eventually annex Taiwan, the PRC will be able to extend its military power into the west Pacific in the east, Japan and South Korea in the north, and the Philippines in the south. It will threaten, if not cut off entirely, Japan's supply sea lane. Under these circumstances, American allies and partners in Asia including Japan can no longer have trust and faith in the U.S. This will create a new and unstable situation in Asia, which are not in the long term national interests of the U.S.

　　The U.S. should conduct its foreign policy in its own interests, and not sacrifice its concerns and values to a short-term and increasingly anachronistic desire to play the "China card." The U.S. must make it unequivocally clear that self-determination of the people on Taiwan must be respected and that an ever-lasting settlement over the "Taiwan question" depends on dialogues between Beijing and Taipei on equal status. The U.S. must not stand in the way of Taiwan joining in the international community. It would be very difficult not to see that Taiwan's security is after all also the security of the U.S.

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