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Both of the terms Taiwanese and Formosan are not only
semantically ambiguous but also politically loaded, and at times
carry a pejorative sense, especially in Taiwan.3 To avoid any
confusion, we need to discern the different referents the terms
are referring to. There are basically three interpretations for
the former and two for the latter.
For outsiders, Taiwanese simply denotes all inhabitants in
Taiwan. Hence, in its broadest sense, Taiwanese includes the
Mainlanders and the native Taiwanese (in a narrower sense), which
will be discussed in the next section. Nationalist leaders of
the Taiwanese Independence Movement (TIM) and the Democratic
Progressive Party (hereafter DPP), the opposition party,4 tend to
define it so broadly as to encompass all "those who live in
Taiwan and are concerned with the destiny of Taiwan."
Accordingly, the referents of the two definitions share
congruence, though with different contentions.
Secondly, the academic usage of Taiwanese is much narrower,
designating the native Taiwanese, whose ancestors immigrated to
Taiwan centuries ago until the Japanese occupied in 1895. It is
made up of the Hoklos, Hakkas, and the aborigines, and excludes
the Mainlanders (meaning people from other provinces). The term
Mainlander designate those emigres and followers of generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek, who fled to Taiwan after their defeat by the
Chinese communists in 1949, and their descendants. This
interpretation is also supported by most of the DPP as well as
fervent agitators of the TIM.
Lastly, in its daily and narrowest sense, Taiwanese is
reserved for the Hoklos.5 One explanation why the Hoklos have
retained this term for their own is probably that they are the
first group that decided to settle down and identify Taiwan,
rather than China, as their homeland. However, this usage dooms
to become obsolete as the Hakkas, lexically meaning "guest
resident" or "strangers," also deem Taiwan as their home
gradually and begin to call themselves Taiwanese.6 This usage is
discouraged by the Taiwanese Nationalists since the monopoly of
the term by the Hoklos is bound to alienate the Hakkas.
The term Formosa is synonymous to Taiwan, as Formosan is to
Taiwanese. Portuguese adventurers hailed Ilha Formosa (Beautiful
Island), when they first past by the island in the sixteen
century (Davidson, 1903: 10). In the earlier literature on
Taiwan, it is also used to designate the native Taiwanese.
Nowadays, probably only anthropologists retain it to term the
aborigines (Coon, 1965). In the past, die-hard proponents of the
TIM overseas preferred it to Taiwanese since it does not carry
any connection with China, and hence assigned a romantic tribute
to it. It is not popular in Taiwan, however, because of its
alien origin.
DEFINITIONS OF ETHNIC GROUP
One prerequisite for identifying ethnic problems in Taiwan
is the existence of any ethnic differentiation at all. Before we
are able to undertake this task, we need to investigate the
literature on ethnic relationship and find out what definitions
of ethnic group have been offered by scholars in this field.
Ethnicity is a relatively new phenomenon and term. While
the 1931 edition of the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences
(Murdock, 1931) lists an entry of "ethnic communities," the term
"ethnic group" is not defined until in the 1968 edition of the
International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences (Morris,
1968). The concept of ethnic group has evolved over the years as
interests in and research on ethnic relationship are expanding.
Its current usage has been restricted to social division
resulting from culture, while, in contrast, racial group is used
to represent biological differences, especially the Black-White
one. This layman demarcation is too vague to be of use since
cultural and biological heritages are in essence inter-twined
(van den Berghe, 1967: 10). Therefore, we need to examine the
competing definitions of ethnic groups and endeavor to attain any
criteria that can be applied to the case of Taiwan.
Four definitions of ethnic group have been identified for
this study: purist, objective, subjective, and objective-
subjective.
i) Purist Definition
Snyder (1983) is the lone proponent of a purist definition
of ethnic group. Tracing the origin of ethnicity back to the
Greek word "ethnos," or nation, he dogmatically insists that
ethnic group be restricted to those resulting from racial
differences. In its strictest form, therefore, the term may only
be applied to the case of racial relationships such as those in
the United States and South Africa. By defining it this way,
Snyder has limited the utility and the scope of the term. His
intention to avoid the contamination of the term by other uses
than the original (meaning "racial") one is understandable.
Language, however, is evolving since we can not avoid
constantly assigning new meanings to the same term (Riggs, 1986).
Snyder's effort appears to gain few echoes (except van den Haag,
1973; Wolf, 1986) judging by the fact that ethnicity is generally
believed to result from cultural differences rather than racial
ones only.
ii) Objective Definition
Most scholars agree that there are some objective criteria
for classifying ethnic groups, such as culture, language,
religion, history (or common experience), nationality, or even
race. In this all-inclusive fashion, group division is based
either on cultural or biological differences, except economic
ones. Nevertheless, there is no consensus as to which criteria
are necessary for the identification of ethnic groups.
However, we do not think this is a real issue, since not all
characteristics of ethnic cleavage are equally identifiable or of
the same importance in every country. In other words, objective
criteria are contingent to countries under investigation. Even
if any agreement can be reached, the presence of all objective
criteria can not guarantee sufficiently the existence of ethnic
division. This type of definition is therefore criticized to be
"built on sand." (Young, 1976: 49)
iii) Subjective Definition
The opposite position to the above one is the emphasis of
the subjective self-identification shared by people belonging to
the same group. Weber thus defines ethnic groups as "those human
groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent
because of similarities of physical type or customs or both or
because of memories of colonization and migration" (Sinnott &
Davis, 1981: 398). Stack (1981: 18) similarly defines ethnicity
as a "subjective identity that clearly distinguishes between
group members and outsiders." This approach is adopted to
redress the futility found in the former definition in identify-
ing group differentiation.
Still, the verstehen fashion is not devoid of any criticism.
One flaw is the difficulty in defining ethnic group readily and
objectively owing to its subjective nature. The strongest
opposition to this way of defining ethnic group comes from those
who attempt to quantify the phenomena of ethnicity. For them, it
amounts to chaotic anarchy and hence unacceptable.
iv) Objective-Subjective Definition
A compromising definition of ethnic group in the middle
ground seems more feasible: a subjective belief based on
objective criteria, be they real or putative (Schermerhorn, 1970;
12). Most scholars agree that both objective and subjective
components of ethnic group are indispensable. As objective
criteria can not of themselves lead to self-consciousness among
members of the group necessarily, so cannot the subjective "we-
you" differentiation arise without being built on any discernable
objective criterion. A close examination of the Weber's
definition reveals that the subjective belief has to be built on
certain objective conditions. Put in another way, objective
criteria of ethnic group are the bases of ethnic consciousness;
however, it further needs certain catalyst to make group members
perceive their distinctions to others.
According to the presence of subjective consciousness among
group members, van Haegendoren (1982: 49) differentiates between
sleeping ethnic group and ethnic group, Jackson (1984: 207) does
between ethnic category and ethnic group, and Yinger (1983: 395)
does between ethnicity and full ethnicity. As Brass (1976: 226)
rightly observes, these differences are in degree rather than in
kind. Later, we will argue that ethnic division in Taiwan falls
in the objective-subjective definition.
IDENTIFICATION OF ETHNICITY IN TAIWAN
Academic opinions are divided on whether there exists ethnic
division in Taiwan or not. Smooha (1975: 85), for instance,
classifies Taiwan as candidate of "nonpluralistic" country. On
the other hand, Connor (1973: 2) treats Taiwan as a country that
has experienced domestic conflict from ethnic diversity.
Unfortunately, few show how they have arrived at their judgment.
Still, we will examine possible reasons lying behind the
divarication of judgment in this section.
i) Absence of Ethnicity
One crucial impeding factor that has hindered our
understanding ethnic phenomena in Taiwan, we must point out, is
political imperative. The Mainlander-Taiwanese relationship has
been deemed a sensitive taboo by the Kuomintang (or Chinese
Nationalist Party, hereinafter KMT) government, which has until
recently discouraged, if not forbidden, its discussion for fear
of any negative impacts on the regime. Any study of ethnic
problem in Taiwan, we believe, will be incomplete without taking
the official attitude into account.
The official position denies the existence of any ethnic
cleavage in Taiwan and dismisses the term Taiwanese as nonsense,
arguing that there was no such a term historically (see Central
Daily News, 24 march 1986) and further that there were only the
division of Chuanchous, Changchous, and Hakkas during the Ch'ing
dynasty. Therefore, the argument follows, if there is any
Taiwanese consciousness at all, it is due to the instigation of
"Japanese and American imperialists."
In our view, historical explanation is not always useful in
explaining political phenomena as the latter usually evolve over
times. It is true that most ancestors of the Hoklos were either
Chuanchous or Changchous. However, this distinction died out in
the later Ch'ing era and completely disappeared during the
Japanese rule through island-wide migration, residential mixture,
and even intermarriage. Nowadays, rarely Hoklos are able to tell
if their ancestors were Chuanchous or Changchous. On the
contrary, he will quickly identify himself as a Taiwanese.
Accordingly, the yardstick of the coinage of any new term is
popular acceptance instead of historical existence. Moreover,
appealing to anti-imperialism can hardly negate the actuality of
subjective ethnic awareness.
In the same historical vein, some scholars dismiss the
dichotomy of Mainland-Taiwanese by stressing the antagonism
between, again, the Hoklos and Hakkas, and even between the
Chuanchous and Changchous (see, for example, Copper, 1981: 359;
Walker, 1973: 389). There is no lack of detailed narratives of
"subethnic rivalry" among different groups of settlers for land
and water resources during the intermediary stage of frontier
colonization in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (Lamley,
1981; Davidson, 1903). Nonetheless, the same sources show that
serious clan fighting was rarely seen after the 1860s. Further,
even if the Hoklos and Hakkas still cling tightly to their
respective languages nowadays, it does not preclude the formation
of group identification among themselves. In fact, ethnic
experts suggest that it is not necessary for members of an ethnic
group to be homogeneous (van Haegendoren, 1982: 48; Keyes, 1976:
202; Wirsing, 1981: 8).
It is further contended that since most people in Taiwan are
Han-Chinese and hence share the same culture, there can not be
any division among themselves.7 Given the failure of the
Japanese to assimilate their Taiwanese subjects during their
fifty years of colonization, the lingering impacts of Han culture
on the Taiwanese should not be underestimated. And therefore,
this line of argument can not be negated summarily.
However, culture is only one of various dimensions of
ethnicity and hence does not forbid its members to opt for a new
identity built upon other objective criteria, such as religion,
language, or common historical experience. Therefore,
recognizing that 98 percent of the Taiwanese residents are Han-
Chinese, White (1980: 44) cautions that "subethnic cleavages"
resulting from historical experiences have important political
effects in Taiwan, though he eschews the use of "ethnic
cleavage." Connor (1972: 337) also notices the
"ethnopsychological experiences" possessed by the American
colonists, the Afrikaners, as well as the Taiwanese in relation
to their British, Dutch, as well as Han-Chinese counterparts. In
a word, divergent ethnic identities arising from the same culture
base are thus not improbable.
A similar but slightly different version of the above
argument tackles linguistic distinctions: "Since both Hoklo (or
Hokkien) and Hakka are only two dialects of Chinese, the Hoklos
and Hakkas can not form any distinct identity other than Chinese
one." In their efforts to design an index of ethnic-linguistic
fractionalization, Taylor and Hudson (1972: 216) come across the
problem of whether people speaking different dialects of Chinese,
such as Mandarin (Peiking dialect), Wu, or Cantonese, should be
classified as the same linguistic group, much less the same
ethnic group. Smooha (1975) probably believes they are, and
judges that the ethnic composition of Taiwan is quasi-
homogeneous, even though he fails to elaborate why he has
attained it. On the other hand, Taylor and Hudson (1972: 272)
and Kurian (1979: 45) determine that linguistic and ethnic
composition in Taiwan is heterogeneous.
The relationship between Mandarin and Taiwanese can be
appropriately described as two offshoots evolving from a common
mother language, rather than a trunk-branch one. And if we
recall that the contemporary national languages in Europe were
only treated vernaculars before Renaissance, we will not be so
hasty to disallow the possibility of people speaking dialects on
the same linguistic tree to develop separate identities.
Therefore, the placement of any language in a linguistic tree is
for linguistic purpose, and we should not be misled by the status
of being dialect in judging the existence of ethnic
consciousness.
ii) A Taiwanese Nation
The polar position to the above one claims that there exists
a Taiwanese nation or, at least, it is in the making. This
contention wa originally proposed by proponents of the TIM and by
young Taiwanese nationalists.8 Earlier version of this argument
emphasizes the amalgamation of all inhabitants, including the
Hoklos, Hakkas, the aborigines, and, to a lesser degree, the
earlier Dutch and Japanese colonists, into a new Taiwanese (or
Formosan) nation. It carries some face value, since the history
of Taiwan is marked by the interaction of subsequent waves
immigrants, most of whom were unmarried males in the beginning
(Meskill, 1979: 24). While the Dutch rulers, for instance,
vigorously encouraged the intermarriage among the Dutchmen, the
aborigines, and the Han-Chinese immigrants (Kerr, 1974: 4), the
intermarriage between natives and Japanese was not allowed until
1942 (Wolf, 1972: 5). And at least one group of the aborigines,
the Pepos, meaning plain aborigines, have almost been completely
assimilated by the later Han-Chinese emigrants (Davidson, 1903:
563).9
The idea of a hybrid Taiwanese nation caused more alienation
than popularity, however, owing to the deep-seated attachment to
Han culture and somewhat to Han chauvinism possessed by the Han-
Taiwanese. Ever since, the appeal of a Taiwanese nation has dies
out and centered on common experiences and destiny (or life
community). Nevertheless, political exhortation can not be
equated with facts, as political imperative can not deny the
existence ethnic consciousness. As the process of integration is
still incomplete, we have not observed a full-fledged Taiwanese
nation. At best, it may be qualified as an ethnic consciousness,
or ethnonationalism, to borrow Connor's term (1973).
EMERGING TAIWANESE ETHNIC ASPIRATION
The argument proposing the existence of ethnic division in
Taiwan is more complicated and thus warrants a separate section
for discussion. Most scholars recognize the existence of
cleavage between Mainland and Taiwanese. For instance, Gastil
(1978: 15) treats Taiwanese as a "people without a nation-state,"
and Taylor and Jodice (1983: 55 & 66) recognize Taiwanese as a
group subject to discrimination. But not all are yet ready to
accept the cleavage as ethnic one, except for Connor (1972, 1973,
1979), Gates (1979, 1981), and Lu (1975). In this section, we
will examine both objective and subjective criteria of ethnic
division to discern which definition of ethnic group is
applicable to the case of Taiwan.
i) Physical Criterion
As stated earlier, the strictest definition of ethnicity is
confined to the division resulting from racial, or biological,
differences. Except the aborigines, who are basically of Malayo-
Polynesian origin, both the Mainlanders and Taiwanese are Han-
Chinese. Some claim they are able to differentiate between the
latter two group purely by their phenotypical characteristics.
This will be wholly true if all Mainlanders are from northern
China, since their ancestors must have intermarried with alien
Mongolian and Manchu rulers centuries ago. Similarly, southern
Chinese, the ancestors of the Taiwanese, must have mingled with
the natives when they immigrate southward and settled down. Cole
(1945: 329), for instance, shows us the physical similarity
between the Malayans and southern Chinese. However, the
seemingly convenient criterion is marred by the fact that not all
Mainlanders trace their origin in northern China. This purist
definition of ethnic group is useless here.
ii) Objective Criterion
Linguistic difference seems to be a better, though still
imperfect, objective criterion for ethnic division. In essence,
the four major linguistic groups we have identified, Mainlander,
Hoklo, Hakka, and the Aborigines,10 can be largely distinguished
by linguistic differences. The languages they use are mutually
intelligible. The Mainlanders, originally from diverse provinces
of China and thus speaking different dialects, adopt Mandarin as
their lingua franca at home. The Hoklos speak Hoklo (or Hokkien,
or linguistically known Ammoi), while the mother tongue of the
Hakkas is Hakka; the aborigines speak various Malayo-Polynesian
languages similar to those found in Southeast Asia. According to
the analysis of Kenkyu (1960), a philologist, the difference
between Mandarin and Taiwanese (in its narrowest sense, i.e.
Hoklo) is larger than that between English and German.
Language as a basis for group identification can not be
overestimated (van der Plank, 1975; Fishman, 1981). Keenly aware
of the political use of native languages, the KMT has steadfastly
attempted to discredit them but with more backfire than success
(Cohen, 1986). When applying for linguistic differences as an
objective criterion of group division, we must caution the
presence of few Mainlanders whose mother tongue is either Hoklo
of Hakka but who speak Mandrin at home. Therefore, other
objective criteria must be added to complement linguistic
differentiation.
iii) Objective-Subjective Criteria
The Mainlanders11 are those emigres from China after World
War II and their offsprings, and the Taiwanese are those whose
ancestors immigrated to Taiwan before the War.12 Group
identities based on historical experiences are reinforced by
vocational and residential segregation (Tien, 1975: 626-27),
which in turns help to shape their subjective identity. For the
Mainlanders, their wish had been to retake the Chinese Mainland;
and Taiwan was therefore their temporary residency. This
attitude was indicated in the past reluctance of the KMT
government to invest in massive public works, until the launch of
Ten Major Development Projects in the mid-1970s to shore up
sluggish economy.13
The development of subjective identification to Taiwan
varies among the three groups of Taiwanese. For the aborigines,
they have no fatherland elsewhere to turn to, and are indeed the
true Taiwanese. Earlier Han-Chinese immigrants tended to deem
Taiwan as a place to seek treasure and went back to their
homeland in southern China once successful, as those overseas
Chinese in Southeast Asia did. The sense of being indigenous was
first developed among the Hoklos at least in Ch'ing dynasty, when
they considered themselves the "Puntis," meaning the native
dwellers (Davidson, 1903: 67). And the Taiwanese identity of the
Hakkas must have been shaped before the Japanese occupied Taiwan
(Chen, 1987).
The common identity shared by the Hoklos and Hakkas, and, to
a lesser degree, the aborigines, resulted from their opposition
to the subsequent oppression of alien rulers, the Japanese and
later the KMT. Their first cooperation was observed in the
establishment of the short-lived Taiwan Republic in 1895, where
both the Hoklos and Hakkas participated. The resistance war
failed partly due to their distrust to each other, and, to some
degree, due to their feud with the aborigines, however (Lamley,
1970; Davidson, 1903: 366).
Ironically, it was Japanese discrimination against the
natives that had helped to foster a new Taiwanese identity.
Moreover, the modern development advanced by the colonists turned
out to further the Taiwanese solidarity by providing modern media
of communications, such as railroads and a common language
(Thayer, 1974: 101; Eto, 1964: 53; Meisner, 1964: 151). Armed
resistance was transformed into cultural and political struggle
when the ideal of home-rule was introduced in 1914 (Okada, 1955:
378). After World War I, Woodrow Wilson's doctrine of self-
determination further inspired Taiwanese nationalism in seeking
autonomy (Ng, 1967: 6). We may find active nationalist movement
in the form of political and cultural activities after 1920 (Ong,
1964: 163; Mancall, 1964: 3). However, as Ng (1967: 6) has
rightly perceived, the Taiwanese consciousness never grew in full
blossom during the Japanese rule.
A strong Taiwanese awareness develop during the KMT rule,
paradoxically. When Taiwan was retroceded to China in 1945, the
Nationalist Chinese were received warmly as "liberators" by the
natives. However, the Taiwanese soon were disillusioned that
their Chinese brethren occupied Taiwan as a war booty and treated
them as a "defeated nation" (Ong, 1964: 164).14 Positions at all
levels left by the Japanese were filled out by the Mainlanders,
no matter how incompetent they were. The KMT took over all
industries and properties built by the Japanese and sold raw
material and manufactured goods in Mainland. By 1946, Taiwan
first suffered the shortage of such foods as rice and sugar,
which had thus far been abundant in Taiwan (Lumley, 1976: 56-59;
Riggs, 1952: 45-65). Political discontent was thus worsened by
economic exploitation and deterioration.
Taiwanese resentment was sparked into an island-wide
uprising on February 28, 1947, after a Taiwanese woman was gunned
down by a Mainlander employed by the Taiwan Monopoly Bureau. The
"February 28 Incidence" proved to be the critical watershed of
the Taiwanese consciousness. The uprising was cold-blood crushed
soon after reinforcements from mainland China landed at Taiwan.
It was estimated that between 5,000 to 30,000 Taiwanese elites
were massacred in the ensuing vengeance, including famous
scholars, doctors, lawyers, newspaper editors, journalists,
businessmen, and students (Mendel, 1970: 37; Kerr, 1956: 310; The
China White Paper: 308).
The impacts of the incidence were far-reaching both for the
KMT and the Taiwanese. For the latter, the lost of a whole
generation of potential leaders in the aftermath could not be
made up until thirty years later. The memory of door-to-door
roundup of high school students is still fresh among the old
generation (Wurfel, 1963: 107). For a long time, Taiwanese
parents always forbade their children to be engaged in political
activities. For the KMT, the white terror only alienated the
natives and spoiled their patriotism, and the possible
retaliation by the Taiwanese always seems a haunting nightmare.
The ethnic division was further strengthened by the KMT's
determination to cling to political power in Taiwan after it was
forced to evacuate its Nationalist Government to the island. As
nepotism prevailed, the numerically majority Taiwanese were
dominated by the Mainlanders. In the beginning, to justify the
domination, the KMT portrayed the Taiwanese as inferior, or even
racially impure. Only the so-called "Pan-sans" (literally Half-
mountain), Taiwanese who went back to Mainland during the
Japanese rule and thus had contact with the KMT, were trusted.
Ostensibly, the government claimed to adhere to the
principle of egalitarianism. Any mention of power distribution
will be dismissed as "parochialism" or "provincialism," and be
accused of "trying to wreck national harmony." In reality,
however, the official policy had been self-contradictory until
the late 1980s. To maintain the domination of the Mainlanders,
the KMT has made all efforts to retain Taiwanese-Mainlander
distinction. For instance, the identification card recorded
everyone's origin of province. Students are still asked to fill
in their origin of province in all documents the day they enter
school in every stage. In fact, origin of province has been the
most important identification criterion, especially in affairs
related to the government. Moreover, the Mainlanders are from
time to time reminded of the possible resurgence of the "February
28 Incidence." Only this time, they will be "massacred and
expelled by the Taiwanese into the Taiwan Strait."15
Another indication of Taiwanese solidarity is the
renaissance of the Taiwanese (mainly Hoklo), which is a reaction
to the efforts of the government to "Mandarinize" the natives.
Given the fact that the Mainlanders are numerically minority, it
is not difficult to perceive the uneasiness and enthusiasm of the
government to assimilate the natives culturally. Language is
believed to be the major instrument, if not source, for identity
formation. Thus, successful suppression of the native languages
will hopefully warrant the forestalling of a Taiwanese
consciousness. As a result, native languages have been forbidden
in school use since 1963, Taiwanese movies have been banned, TV
programs in Taiwanese have been limited no more than 15 percent
of total programming time, and in 1982, popular Taiwanese opera
on TV was ordered to be played in Mandarin (China Daily News, 26
November 1985; Taiwan Tribune, 16 June 1986; Cohen, 1986).
Even though Taiwanese had in the past been persistently
portrayed as vulgar, graceless, and cumbersome, it becomes
popular among colleges students in recent years, especially male
ones, which indicates the rise of Taiwanese ethnic, or more
appropriately, nationalist, consciousness. Another more
identifiable indicator of Taiwanese identity is found in the
popular Taiwanese Folk Literature movement emerging in the 1970s,
which inspires the Taiwanese that their languages can be recorded
in Chinese scripts as Mandarin can (see Song, 1985). All these
show that a subjective Taiwanese consciousness is inspired by and
intertwined with objective criteria -- here, common experiences
of alien rulers and linguistic differences.
THE QUEST FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE
While scholarly research on economic development in Taiwan
is abundant (see Kao, 1984). Academic interest in political
development in Taiwan seems scanty (see Jacobs, et al., 1984).
Wei (1973: 75) attributes the neglect to the biases of the "old
China hands," who think Taiwan is unworthy of studying because of
its tiny size compared with mammoth China. This is still true
considering the national interest of the Unites States and its
policy of rapprochement with China. Henceforth the contention,
"Who cares for Taiwan?" Another explanation is political
development in Taiwan lags far behind its economic development,
which may have further convinced political scientists that
academic contribution from research on Taiwan is hopelessly
limited. We argue that political development in Taiwan may shed
some light on the understanding of ethnic relationship.
A brief review of relevant literature reveals that most
works on Taiwan are based on the assumption of an one-party
political system. And political phenomena are interpreted as
parts of the transitional movement from authoritarianism to
democracy (Domes, 1981; Tien, 1980; Chou & Nathan, 1987;
Winckler, 1984). Therefore, their focus has been on factions
within the KMT, elections, the interactions between the KMT and
TW, succession to Chiang Ching-kuo, and even maneuver in the
palace (see Chang, 1984; Lu, 1985).
It seems that TW also takes a similar democratic rhetoric,
considering its struggle with the KMT as a process of
democratization, at least in open. It is partly due to the fact
that political discussion in the context of ethnic group
relations is not allowed. It may also be owing to strategic
consideration -- to avoid alienating moderate Mainlanders16 and
to prevent them from seeking help from their compatriots in
China. Therefore, it was decided that the title of the
opposition party, the DPP, not to include the word Taiwan, in
order to play down Taiwanese elements (Centre Daily News, 2
October 1986).
The major weakness of this approach is that it neglects, if
not ignore, the dynamics of group interactions between the
Taiwanese and Mainlanders.17 As we have pointed out earlier, the
basic political problem in Taiwan is two ethnic groups competing
for power and scarce resources in an asymmetrical political
structure. People ask: "Why can't Taiwanese be the President?
Why can't Taiwanese be chancellor of the university?" Political
mobilization of the DDP, for instance, is also based on a
Taiwanese consciousness. Political conflicts are thus best
understood in terms of group competition. Therefore, we argue
that a perspective based on ethnic relationship may be an
alternative and hope that the wisdom of literature on ethnic
relationship may provide us new insights.
ENDNOTES
1. The government prefers to be called Republic of China,
Republic of China on Taiwan, or more recently, Chinese Taipei.
2. No reliable census data on ethnic composition are
available. Only the last figure is accurate.
3. So far, the Ministry of Interior has stubbornly refused
the registration of any voluntary association carrying "Taiwan"
on its formal title.
4. Before the emergence of the DPP, the moderate elements of
the opposition (or Tang-wai, literally meaning outside the ruling
Kuomintang, hereafter TW), played a dominant role.
5. It is equivalent to Hokkiens, or, in Mandarin, Minnans,
suggesting their origin in southern parts of the province Hokkien
in southern China.
6. The evolution of the Taiwanese identity will be explored
later.
7. Some have even gone so far as to include the Aborigines
are Han-Chinese too by showing archaeological evidences.
8. See the discussion in Tai Tu Chi K'an, no. 1, & no. 4.
The author organized a symposium on Taiwanese nationalism
recently. The proceeding will be published in the book format
soon.
9. During a demonstration rally attended mainly by the
aborigines, around 300 Pepos showed up despite prior political
pressure to discourage their showing up.
10. The Aborigines can further classified into 11 "tribes."
11. Some Mainlander supporters of the TIM cause coined the
term "New Residents" for themselves recently.
12. Some suggest 1895 as the cutting point, when Taiwan was
ceded to Japan and thus cross-strait migration was prohibited
formally. See Barnett, 1960, p. 387.
13. There are indications showing that more and more second
generation Mainlanders are identifying themselves with Taiwan.
See Taiwan Tribune, 4 April 1985, and 18 December 1986. Some
young Mainlanders even proclaim that they are Taiwanese too. See
Taiwan Tribune, 4 April 1984. Nevertheless, the degree of
Mainlander attachment to Taiwan remains to be investigated, since
reliable survey on political attitudes in Taiwan is unattainable
so far.
14. During a recent interview to a famous Japanese
journalist, President Lee voiced the"sorrow shared by the
Taiwanese."
15. See for example, Centre Daily News, 5 March 1987; Cole,
1967: 648.
16. Some second-generation Mainlanders broke away from the
KMT and established the Chinese New Party in 1993.
17. Ethnic conflicts along the Hoklo-Hakka and the Han-
Aborigine dimension are less threatening.
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