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The shifting U.S.-Taiwan relations
The Evian mini-summit
On June 1, U.S. President George W. Bush briefly discussed the Taiwan issue with China's President Hu Jintao on the sidelines of the G8 summit at Evian, France. In a press briefing later in the day, a senior Bush administration official described what President Bush said at this meeting, triggering speculations in the media whether U.S. policy towards Taiwan has changed.
On June 2, Taiwan's Cabinet Spokesman Lin Chia-lung tried to reassure the public: "...we should have faith in Taiwan-U.S. relations because the U.S. government is not changing its stance to one that could harm us." ("Cabinet plays down US remark," Taipei Times, June 3, 2003.) A few days later, American Institute in Taiwan Chairwoman Therese Shaheen told the Taiwan news media's Washington correspondents "there was no hidden message in President Bush's remarks to President Hu....Bush merely said the U.S. was not supporting Taiwan independence." (Editorial, China Post, June 9, 2003.)
On the other hand, China's People's Daily smugly noted that after having deviated to the right from the policy of the previous six U.S. administrations, Bush's Taiwan policy has now moved back to the middle. ("US Policy toward Taiwan swings to the middle," June 13, 2003.) It supported this view partly by twisting Bush's "non-support" to "opposition" towards Taiwan independence and partly by deliberately confusing America's One China Policy with Beijing's One China Principle, two phrases with distinctly different substance.
Regardless of the official platitudes, has U.S. policy towards Taiwan changed? Before we examine this question, it will be helpful to cite verbatim what the senior administration official said at the backgrounder press briefing.
"On Taiwan, the President repeated our policy of a one-China policy based on the three communiques, the Taiwan Relations Act, no support for Taiwan independence. The Chinese basically accepted that, and said, okay, that's positive. They did say they have concerns about forces on Taiwan moving towards independence. The President said, we don't support independence. The President also said, however, within that context, if necessary, we will help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself. We will, as we say in the Taiwan Relations Act, provide necessary defensive weapons. " (News Release from the White House website.)
Weakening U.S. support
President Bush's remarks reveal a perceptible weakening in U.S. support for Taiwan. First, this is the first time no support for Taiwan independence has been elevated to the level of the Taiwan Relations Act and the three joint communiques. Second, Bush didn't mention peaceful resolution with the assent of the Taiwanese people. Finally, in April of 2001, Bush pledged that the U.S. would help defend Taiwan "whatever it took." This represented a firm commitment to exert maximum effort in Taiwan's defense. The new wording, "If necessary, we will help Taiwan to the extent possible defend itself" contains two qualifications.
The phrase "if necessary" can simply be interpreted to mean "if China were to attack Taiwan." But then the phrase is superfluous because U.S. intervention presupposes Chinese military aggression. There is little question that if the People's Liberation Army (PLA) were to launch a massive, multi-pronged blitzkrieg against Taiwan, the island nation could not alone repel the Chinese forces over a period of many months, given the disparity in military power between the two sides. Taiwan would clearly need active U.S. assistance to preserve its freedom. China has always insisted on its "right" to use coercion against Taiwan. Beijing in fact has promised to take military action against Taiwan if Taiwan refused to surrender its sovereignty and democracy indefinitely. So why the qualifying phrase "if necessary"? An alternative interpretation is that Bush is hedging against the possibility of Taipei opting to unilaterally accept Beijing's claim of sovereignty over Taiwan. Similarly, the phrase "to the extent possible" could be read to be a hedge against the eventuality of Taiwan's leadership caving in to PLA coercion within the first days of the conflict, thus making it impossible for U.S. forces to intervene.
Taiwan's leaning toward China
The above parsing of Bush's remarks may be too pessimistic but it is not groundless. Although not officially acknowledged, Washington is steadily losing confidence in Taipei's resolve to fight for Taiwan's survival as a democratic and de facto independent nation. Under the Chen administration's Active Opening policy of economic integration with China, Taiwan's economy is increasingly dependent on China. Due to massive outflow of capital, technology and technical and management manpower to China, Taiwan's economy is being hollowed out, with high unemployment, bad loans left by businesses transplanted to China and rising crime. And yet, all political parties are intent on early implementation of the direct links with China, further endangering Taiwan's political independence and national security. While China has expanded its military expenditure year after year and has been modernizing the PLA at a rapid pace through purchases of state of the art weaponry and frequent large-scale joint force exercises, Taiwan has been cutting its defense budget steadily for the past decade. Taipei has exhibited such a complacent and negligent posture towards its own security that observers wonder whether the government is serious about national defense.
There will be a presidential election in Taiwan next year. With the combined KMT-PFP ticket, the opposition parties have a solid chance to take power. It is widely believed that the leaders of the KMT and PFP would speedily negotiate terms of unification with Beijing as soon as they won in the presidential election. KMT Chairman Lein Chan, as a matter of fact, has already pledged to undertake such "journey of peace" to Beijing if he were to win the presidency.
The Chen administration, too, has done its share in undermining America's trust of Taiwan as a reliable ally. In his New Year's Eve message in 2000, President Chen proclaimed that since China and Taiwan share similar history, culture and ethnicity (these premises are essentially false) it is the policy of his administration to promote cultural and economic integration with the People's Republic of China (PRC), leading eventually to political integration with the PRC. Since then, Chen has been vaunting his "integration doctrine" to visiting foreign dignitaries and U.S. Congressional delegations. He has also sent high officials to the U.S. and China to expound on the doctrine.
U.S. doubt on Taiwan's ultimate aim
Under the calm surface of seemingly friendly U.S.-Taiwan relations, there is serious concern in Washington about Taiwan's ultimate intentions. This undercurrent of mistrust is eroding the very foundation of U.S.-Taiwan partnerships in the cause of freedom and democracy. For example, last fall the U.S. House of Representatives passed Section 1202, the so-called interoperability provision attached to an appropriations bill to enhance training and exchanges between the U.S. and Taiwan militaries. The Senate failed to pass the provision. When the House-Senate conference committee tried to fashion a compromise, both the White House and the State Department were opposed and the Pentagon was neutral. The final provision which was enacted was essentially toothless and without substance.
On June 2, the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Project for the New
American Century in Washington, D.C. co-hosted a conference to discuss the prospects for a U.S.-Taiwan Free Trade Agreement (FTA). The conference featured Deanna Okun, chairwoman of the International Trade Commission; Therese Shaheen, chairwoman of the American Institute in Taiwan; Gordon Chang, author of The Coming Collapse of China; and specialists such as Greg Mastel, Chief International Trade Adviser of Miller & Chevalier and Steven Clemons of the New American Foundation. Majority Leader Tom DeLay was the keynote speaker.
A U.S.-Taiwan FTA is desirable from Taipei's perspective because it would create a segment of American business with a vested interest in Taiwan's survival as an independent country. As many speakers at the AEI conference pointed out, the political significance of such FTA outweighs the economic benefits. The Bush administration has been bestowing FTAs to nations it favors to show approval. While Tom DeLay and several other members of Congress have urged an FTA with Taiwan, the Bush administration has refused to place Taiwan on the list of potential free trade partners. Ostensibly the obstacle lies in the issues raised by the U.S. Trade Representative's office such as intellectual piracy, import quota on rice and other foodstuffs, and non-tariff barriers against U.S. telecommunications and financial services companies. The basic problem lies in the growing uncertainty regarding Taiwan's commitment to a democratic future.
Tom DeLay's speech
It is premature to say that Washington has lost all hope of preserving Taiwan's status quo as an independent nation, free from China's political control. At his AEI speech, Majority Leader DeLay attacked the One China Policy and affirmed U.S. commitment to help defend Taiwan:
"...the One China Policy ... is the means to an end, not the end itself. America's primary objective in Asia....is the preservation of democracy and the expansion of freedom."
"Some have wanted to transform this diplomatic nuance into a recognition of Beijing's territorial claim over Taiwan: a recognition that has not and never will exist."
"We must not allow a thriving democracy to be swallowed up by a Communist dictatorship. As long as a free and democratic Taiwan, willing to defend itself [emphasis added], needs help securing its borders, we will be there."
Regarding the U.S. position on Taiwan independence, the following comments of Senator Jesse Helms, former chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, are relevant:
"The United States should neither support nor oppose independence for Taiwan. While a declaration of independence by Taiwan would be suicidal and must not be encouraged, Taiwan is, after all, a democracy; as a revolutionary nation ourselves, the U.S. has little moral authority to foreclose that option to the 23 million free people who live in Taiwan."
Conclusion
To summarize, the Bush administration's earlier robust support of Taiwan has been diluted primarily due to Taipei's failure to unequivocally commit Taiwan to a democratic path and secondarily due to America's need to elicit China's help in fighting global terror and in resolving the North Korean nuclear crisis. However, this shift in U.S. stance is tactical, not strategic. The U.S. still has geostrategic, political and economic interests in maintaining the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. The recent appointment of Princeton professor and prominent China specialist Aaron Friedberg to the post of deputy national security advisor and director of policy planning on Vice President Cheney's high-powered foreign policy staff tends to support this conclusion. Friedberg will be the only recognized Sinologist in such a senior position. He is alert to the potential dangers a modernized PLA may pose for U.S. homeland security and has often written about the likelihood of a U.S.-China confrontation in the future.
After 9-11, world politics has become highly volatile and unpredictable. U.S.-Taiwan relations cannot escape the dynamics of changing international relations. Opinion surveys show a great majority of the Taiwanese people prefer the status quo and reject rule by the People's Republic. The citizens must therefore elect political leaders with the vision, wisdom and courage to safeguard the life, liberty and property of the 23 million people of Taiwan. This means disenfranchising politicians and businessmen whose allegiance rests with China instead of Taiwan. If this can be achieved, then Taiwan can secure firm and unflinching U.S. support and with it a prosperous, free and democratic Taiwan.(06/16/03)
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Li Thian-hok 2003/06/24
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